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**EURASIAN RESEARCH JOURNAL,
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Research Article*

**EURASIAN ENERGY SECURITY IN THE FACE OF
RUSSO-UKRAINIAN TENSIONS AND TURKEY'S ROLE AS
A POTENTIAL ENERGY HUB**

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ABSTRACT

After the political and military crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2014, the EU's energy security was again in question. In fact, this was not the first time for the EU to question the reliability of the Russian energy supply. Similar disputes sparked controversies over gas prices in 2006 and 2009 in the context of efforts to maintain secure and reliable energy markets. Russia has often used its energy resources as an instrument of threat and blackmail in foreign policy relations with the EU, especially after the 2000s. Regarding alternative energy routes, Turkey has raised an important option since the end of the Cold War. Its location as a geographic bridge connecting east and west, as well as the strategic ownership of gas pipelines such as TANAP increase Turkey's potential to contribute to the European energy security in case if it becomes a real energy hub rather than a transit country.

Keywords: Energy security, Nabucco, TANAP, Turkish Stream, Russia, Ukraine.

ENERGY SECURITY IN THE GRAND CHESSBOARD

Academic efforts in order to make sense of the increasing importance of pipeline politics in world affairs and the new “great war” in Brzezinski’s “grand chessboard, and especially in the Caspian region to control and use its vast resources has been a major study area during the post-Cold war era. The last two decades have witnessed a fiercer battle for energy security and the uninterrupted energy flow especially in and around the Caspian region mainly due to the emergence of the power vacuum which was then replaced by a quite clear “Russian comeback” . While energy interruptions were not widely experienced even during the Cold War era due to the continuing flow of the resources to Europe by the USSR even if the two are positioned in opposing blocs (Dannreuther, 2006: 198), the post-Cold War environment raised questions about the reliability of this flow. Within this context, since the flow of natural gas and oil requires a supply and demand side as well as a transit country/countries, the three actors seemed to be even more important in the new energy game in the town; energy giant Russia, energy-hungry Europe, and politically-preferable transit route Turkey, respectively. The debates over European energy security or more broadly of the East-West energy corridor had become more popular after the energy crisis of 2006, a politically-motivated Russian move against Ukraine as a warning against its pro-Western re-orientation and a strategic move to downgrade Ukrainian reputation in the Western eyes as a reliable transit route through which almost half of Gazprom’s flow to the EU passes (Cheavlier, 2009: 109 and “Ukraine Natural Gas Facts). The recent annexation of Crimea by Russia, defying all outside criticism and rejection was comparatively much more concerning within the context of energy security and Russo-Ukrainian relationship which in many cases has a quite important impact upon the Russo-European relationship as well. It was not the first time that Russia strategically used its energy card, but this time the European capitals much more seriously felt the need to find a common solution to the risk of having an aggressive energy supplier with gradually increasing leverage over Europe.

Within the context of such a background, the very concept of “energy security” deserves greater attention since securing energy supply, as seen from the Russian moves in the post-Cold War era, has indeed become a major issue in terms of security, politics, foreign policy and economics. Before thinking about how energy supply can be secure and accessible for the actors in need, defining the concept and elaborate on its components is essential in order to have a better grasp of the concept itself and apply it to the Russo-Ukrainian and Russia-EU contexts.

Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005) define the concept of energy security as follows:

“In its most fundamental sense, energy security is assurance of the ability to access the energy resources required for the continued development of national power. In more specific terms, it is the provision of affordable, reliable, diverse, and ample supplies of oil and gas...” (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005: 9).

Pascual and Elkind mention 4 elements of energy security as “availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability” (Pascual and Elkind, 2010: 122). The European Commission refers it as “uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all consumers” (Sovacool, 2010:

4). The MIT Working Group on Asian Energy and Security puts its emphasis on the prevention of any possible energy crisis and if it occurs anyway, to limit its impact by decreasing the demand-side's vulnerability (Hippel et al., 2010: 75). Lastly, and as a quite compact but powerful definition comes from Dyer and Trombetta who refer to the concept as "continuous access to various forms of energy in sufficient quantity and at affordable prices" (Dyer and Trombetta, 2013: 3-18) Thus, drawing from the intersection points of all these definitions, to refer to the flow of a particular energy resource as secure, the flow of energy resources from the supply side to the demand side should be reliable and sustainable. This flow should be free from probable energy crises which would have serious economic and political impacts. Moreover, a hegemonic supplier is unacceptable due to the risks which is stemming from vulnerability of the demand side since energy resources are regarded as highly strategic assets.

Within this context, with its rich energy resources and the relatively more insecure character of the Middle Eastern supply points, the ex-Soviet area is quite central to the efforts to diversify the supply and if possible, transit route, too, which would not only challenge Russian pricing policy but also limit the political risks attached to the current dependency on the Russian supply. This centrality of the geography has been a timeless centrepiece of the geopolitical studies. Brzezinski is still right in its assumption that "Nonetheless, geographic location still tends to determine the immediate priorities of a state—and the greater its military, economic, and political power, the greater the radius, beyond its immediate neighbors, of that state's vital geopolitical interests, influence, and involvement." (Brzezinski, 1979: 38). Echoing this assumption implicitly, Grigas (2017) argues that the geopolitical notion of Eurasia is possibly more important than the geographic one" whereas Kaplan (2018) further strengthens this position with an energy dimension starting that "just as there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopolitics, there is also energy geopolitics". Austvik and Rzayeva (2017: 540) quite rightly argue that "Geopolitics is very much is a geo-economic phenomenon and vice versa. Any state's control of a given territory is in the end a question of "economic gain" – how to finance the costs and how to gain an optimal share of the values created or transmitted in/on that territory" which explicitly underlines the link between economics, energy, geopolitics and thus the rivalry over critical geographies within the context of energy-driven political chessboard. The two considered together, can be said that echoing what Mackinder had thought of the region, "the Heartland" (Mackinder, 1904: 421-444), or Brzezinski's "grand chessboard" stretching "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" (Brzezinski, 1979: 35). Further reinforcing this line of argumentation, and historically a thought-provoking argument comes from Sempa (2002) who argued that the struggle for "Eurasian mastery" was the "geopolitical essence of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War".

Therefore, how the puzzle between the EU and Russia (as the two key actors in this geopolitically vital "heartland" and the key supply and demand players of the Eurasian chessboard aside from the Far Eastern booming demand), was formed, structured and restructured over time, which moves resulted in the increasing number of debates about the European energy security and the risks of the EU's dependency on the Russian energy supply would be discussed in the next section in the light of the Russo-Ukrainian crisis till 2015.

THE PUZZLE OF THE ENERGY POLITICS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU: THE QUESTION OF DEPENDENCE

Since energy dependency is not a problem per se, and it needs an aggressor in order for it to be defined as a risk, the missing link has been the strategic use of energy resources by a power, which is Russia in our case with an interest-oriented attitude in the form of either altering the amount of the flow or increase in prices. Especially during the independence period of the Baltic states, Russia used this weapon for numerous times in 1990, 1992, 1994 and even between 1998-2000 to “punish” their moves towards independence at first, and then, as a result of their cooperation with the West (Smith, 2006: 1-2). According to Lough, that kind of attitude was repeated by Russia over 40 politically motivated situations during the period between 1991 and 2004 (Lough, 2011: 8). Reinforcing the argument that the Russian actions were highly politically motivated, failed attempts to use energy weapon against Ukraine in 1993 just before a meeting on the withdrawal from nuclear weapons and the Black Sea fleet and in 1995 amidst disputes over the Ukrainian membership to the CIS Customs Union speaks for themselves (Fredholm, 2005: 17). One of the major problems with these cases was the silence of the West which was regarded as a dangerous energy-related “appeasement policy”.

Similarly, energy crises of 2006 and 2009 mainly stemmed from political concerns of Russia with the fear of “losing ground in Ukraine”. As a result of these crises, compared to the ones in the 1990s, the EU has paid more attention on its dependency question and its relationship with the Caspian and the Black Sea regions, once again realised the importance of the diversification of not only supply but also transit routes, and saw the importance of a harmonised common European external energy policy to deal with Russian strategic use of its energy card, aiming “to isolate Ukraine, suppress Central Asian energy producers, circumscribe Azerbaijan, and enhance its influence in Turkey and the Balkans.” (Kim and Blank, 2016: 40) Since as of 2019, the EU does not have more than 25 large-scale LNG import terminals accounting for 215.1 bcm which is significant but still less than half of its yearly demand (Yafimava, 2020), it would be safe to argue that pipelines and thus, energy security and Russian use of it as a policy card would keep its significance for the foreseeable future which is basically one of the key reasons behind the Russian efforts to by-pass Ukraine as seen 2014 onwards more intensively as in the cases of Nord Stream 2 and South Stream or the Turkish Stream (Pirani and Yafimava, 2015; Siddi, 2017) as the project underwent changes and downsizing.

CRISES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: A CHRONIC REMINDER OF THE RISKS OF ENERGY DEPENDENCY

2006 Crisis

Regarding the energy crisis in 2006, the process called as “Orange Revolution” is of importance. The semi-authoritarian Ukrainian leadership under Leonid Kuchma suffered from allegations of corruption, nepotism and non-transparent influence of the oligarchs, a common feature of almost all ex-Soviet states. Hence, the presidential elections of 2004 took the form of a choice between the status quo –i.e. the continuation of corrupt and authoritarian rule- and change

–i.e. improvements in rights and freedoms and policy of Westernisation- rather than between the two candidates, namely Viktor Yushchenko and Kuchma's candidate, Viktor Yanukovych (McFaul, 2006: 14-21). In November 2004 Yanukovych was apparently won the election but the fraud in the elections caused mass protests and repeat of the second round of presidential election. As a result of protests and division within the armed forces, Yushchenko improved his chance before and won the presidential election on December 26, 2004 (McFaul, 2006: 35-43).

Pro-Western Yushchenko, promised reforms in domestic politics as well as in relations with Russia and the West. While he aimed at a more transparent energy relationship with Russia including investigations on the murky firm, Ros-Ukr-Energo (RUE) (Lough, 2011: 14) on the other hand he declared his desire to join the EU and even NATO (Dannreuther, 2006: 4). Not surprisingly, during the gas cut off to Ukraine on January 1, 2006, this political change has been argued to be one of the latent reasons of the crisis by the Western media. Consequently, EU member states waiting for the gas through Ukraine has suffered seriously and had to use their strategic reserves in the face of crisis.

Even though the crisis was solved on January 4, 2006, the crisis taught some lessons to all the sides involved; dangers of over-dependence on a single supplier and/or a transit route, the impact of Russian interests-driven policies, use of energy card over third parties, and the need for a powerful international regime to regulate energy trade and to settle disputes (Stern, 2006: 8-13). The belated and ineffective EU response came finally in the form of congratulations to both parties for their efforts to settle the dispute and an emphasis on the need for the EU to consider alternative routes for the future (Stern, 2006: 14). Thus, the first of the blows to the reputation of Ukraine for European customers was supply and Ukrainian route as almost the sole transit route of gas imports. Additionally, the crisis highlighted the possible negative impact of the Russian leverage over East-West energy transportation (Lough, 2011: 8).

2009 Crisis

With the return of Timoshenko to the seat of Prime Ministry in 2007, she aimed at changing some of the basics of the energy trade between Russia and Ukraine by eliminating RUE as the intermediary and to initiate direct sales from Gazprom (Pirani, 2009: 10). The problem arose when Gazprom accused Naftogaz for having a significant amount of debt and “stealing” the gas for domestic storage while Naftogaz denied all these accusations. As a result of these accusations and heightening tension between the two states, gas supply to Ukraine was cut off on January 1, 2009. Until the settlement of the crisis on January 20, gas supplies to Europe were firstly reduced and then completely stopped which was the first time in energy flow records of these actors since the Soviet times. With the agreement on January, 19, the parties agreed on an increase in gas prices flowing to Ukraine, eventually equating them to European prices, stricter payment plans, and enhancing role of the Gazprom's subsidiary in Ukraine, Gazprom-Sbyt. Politically, some disagreements between the President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko has been claimed by Gazprom as one of the causes of the delayed settlement (Pirani, 2009: 15-37) and the Ukrainian political puzzle has been further complicated by these claims.

Sensibly enough, this second blow to the reputation of the Ukrainian route within the context of energy transportation to the West as a reliable transit route was mentioned by Stern as a tool of the Russian administration to strengthen its position regarding its projects, namely Nord and South Stream pipelines towards Europe bypassing Ukraine. European Commission's appointment of a "fact finding mission" on January 5, and President Barroso's attempts to settle the dispute through telephone traffic and deployment of the EU Mission on January 11 were the responses of the European side (Pirani, 2009: 39-47). Even though the EU showed a higher profile compared to the previous crisis of 2006, the efficacy of the ECT to settle disputes and thus, the EU's control over its own energy supply was in question again.

2014 Crisis

In November 2013, Yanukovich decided to suspend political and economic association agreement (Trenin, 2015: 5) with the EU and showed his clear desire to pursue a more pro-Russian policy line by accepting \$15 billion funds from Russia. (Mearsheimer, 2014: 80), This political alternation caused mass protests in Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti /Майдан Незалежності) stemming from the disappointment of the public about the failed path towards a closer relationship with the EU which they saw as an "exit" from the politics plagued by oligarchs, nepotism, corruption, and poverty. The crisis can be seen as the peak point of the Russia vs. the West rivalry over Ukraine so far. After this crises country appears to be on the front lines of a renewed great-power rivalry between east and west. The tension over the country gradually increased in the last decade due to the Ukraine's moves closer towards the EU and NATO indicated that they see their future in Europe and vice versa, rather than for instance a clear Ukrainian move towards joining the Eurasian Economic Union composed of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Armenia which would be operational on January 1, 2015. NATO's actions against Russia's near abroad policy of which the EU's Eastward expansion and its efforts to conclude associations agreements with post-Soviet countries are regarded by Russia as Trojan horses and caused irritation and accepted as serious concerns in the Russian policy-makers' eyes. While the protests in the Maidan are seemed to be ceased with negotiations between Yanukovich and protesters, more radical and ultranationalist groups demanded an immediate and more effective change rather than the reforms Yanukovich promised to conduct. Subsequently, Yanukovich had to flee in late February. Russian response was to act in quite short of time and annexed Crimea of which 60 percent population is ethnic Russian (Mearsheimer, 2014: 81) and Sevastopol on March 18 –based on a referendum held on March 16 thanks to the pro-Russian groups' taking control of the local government- and strongly encourage the independence of the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and further supports such movements in other regions of the Eastern Ukraine. In May, Petro Poroshenko, a pro-Western and pro-Maidan oligarch won the presidential election, and this is resulted with clearly caused irritation in Russia.

In terms of energy politics, in an attempt to "punish" its pro-Russian tendency as early as February, Ukrainian Naftogaz sued its Crimea-based subsidiary Chornomornaftogaz, accusing the firm of delaying its payments. Crimean response in March came quite radically too. The company was nationalised

and handed over to Gazprom (Interfax-Ukraine, 2014). Starting from April, Ukraine faced serious problems regarding natural gas flow from Russia. At first, the discount deal between Gazprom and Naftogaz was cancelled due to not only increased the price Ukraine pays for the Russian gas (from \$268 to \$485.5 per one thousand cubic meters), but also forces Ukraine to pay its debt to Russia as soon as possible. Now, Ukraine also has to pay “in advance” for natural gas. In June, Russia decided to halt natural gas supplies to Ukraine and would provide the country only with the amount that the company’s “European partners” needed (Bloomberg.com, 2014). By this wise move, Russia aimed at silencing Europe to some extent and have a freer hand in implementing its policies against the new Ukrainian government without facing serious European response. Finally, Ukraine had to accept \$385 per one thousand cubic meters which means significant rise compared to the pre-Maidan price, and promised to pay its debt as soon as possible along with its agreement on paying in advance for the Russian natural gas. Since in 2010 Ukraine agreed to extend Russia’s lease to the Black Sea naval base in Crimea from 2017 to 2042 to get cheaper natural gas from Russia already (Bloomberg.com, 2014a), Russian hand is quite powerful in terms of this pricing shift especially after annexing Crimea and thus, has to offer nothing in return for its presence in Crimea. Compared to relatively silent and inefficient but gradually increasing responses of the West in terms of the Russian moves against Ukraine we witnessed in the cases of the crises in 2006 and 2009, this time the EU downgraded its relationship with Russia, NATO froze its cooperation and Russia’s accession process to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was cancelled (Trenin, 2015: 4-8 and Mearsheimer, 2014: 78-79). The European Commission published “European Energy Security Strategy” in which the significance of European “solidarity”, the need for further storage capacities and importance of increasing use of renewables are again underlined with direct reference to such energy crises and to particular potential energy disruptions in the winter of 2014 (European Commission, 2014).

Figure 1. Gazprom’s Gas Supplies to Europe

Gas supplies to Europe


In 2019, Gazprom Export LLC supplied a total of **198,97** billion cubic meters of gas to European countries. Western European countries and Turkey accounted for approximately 77 % of the company’s exports from Russia, while Central European states took 23 %.

Natural gas exports made to countries outside the former Soviet Union by Gazprom Export (billion cubic meters):

Year	1973	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total	6.8	19.3	54.8	69.4	110.0	117.4	130.3	154.3	138.6	158.6	178.3	192.2	200.8	198.97

The **Western European market (including Turkey)** consumes the bulk of Russian exports. In 2019, Gazprom Export delivered **153.39** billion cubic meters of gas to markets in the region. The largest importers are Germany, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and France.

Natural gas supplies via Gazprom Export to the countries of Western Europe and Turkey in 2019, bcm*



Source: gazpromexport.ru


In the “European Energy Security Strategy” of May 2014, the European Commission, referring directly to the recent crisis in Ukraine, once again warned its EU Member States to act in unity and encouraged the use of renewables in order to limit energy dependence on Russia (European Commission, 2014). Still, considering the failed idea of the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to establish an energy union to end the Russian influence on the energy realm or some other proposals from Washington and Brussels to use sanction card on the Russian energy sector, it’d be fair to conclude that even though political and security-related measures were taken more eagerly and urgently, particular bilateral preferences and diverse energy profiles of the EU members still far from ideal to “punish” the “aggressor” within the context of reliable and secure energy flow (Goldthau and Boersma, 2014: 13-15). In terms of common response, however, the EU’s position as the guarantor of the Ukrainian natural gas debt as well as the IMF’s promised support to clear it to secure the “October deal” between Russia and Ukraine can be regarded as important steps (Bbc.com, 2014).

An Interdependent Relationship?

The Russian share in EU’s energy imports, as of 2019, is almost 24.9 percent in oil and 38.3 percent in natural gas (European Commission, 2020). While European energy consumption will increase by 10 percent in 2030, its energy production will decrease by 20 percent and the EU’s own natural gas reserves which for the time being satisfy approximately 43 percent of its demand, but it will satisfy only 16 percent as of 2030 (Liuhto, 2009: 113-114). Therefore, energy issues in European policy-making would be more important in the upcoming decades and since the renewables are far from satisfying European energy demand for now and for the short to medium-term (Aalto, 2009: 157-180 and Belyi, 2005: 364), oil and natural gas would remain as the major resources. On the other hand, Russian dependence on the EU investment to improve its infrastructure and energy sector and EU’s position as a major trade partner for Russia turned the relationship toward mutually dependent one. Russia puts an emphasis on diversifying its supply routes by constructing new pipelines toward Asia and signing deals with the Far East countries as a response to European plan to find alternative pipelines and to limit the Russian investment in European market, a mutual effort to “find alternatives” which engenders further mutual mistrust.

Figure 2. EU-27-Gas Imports


Extra EU-27 imports of natural gas from main trading partners, 2019 and first semester 2020
 (share (%) of trade in value)



Source: ec.europa.eu

Nevertheless, it would be fair to argue that energy resources are proved to be more strategically important assets than the revenues from energy trade which is expected to be spent on investment due to the fact that energy is a more urgent need for the importer side suffering from insufficient storage capacity (Liuhto, 2009: 120). This is the case especially considering the fact that Russia can satisfy required increase in exports with its current infrastructure for the next decades (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005: 43) and investment on its infrastructure stands out neither as an urgent need nor an obligatory task. Still, Russia needs \$330 billion to improve its upstream gas sector only which proves that the money which would follow the footsteps of energy resources is not an expendable source of income for Russia. Through securing its energy sector renovation with Western funds, excessive amounts would allow Russia to canalise its funds to other areas such as arms production and arms trade which is one of the leading sectors of Russian economy (Brzoska, 2004: 113).

Figure 3. *European Energy Dependency*



Source: ec.europa.eu

Within the context of this bilateral energy relationship plagued with mistrust and asymmetrical interdependence, diversification of supply via reliable transit routes is a key to alter the atmosphere; a causal mechanism that brings us to the debate what role can be played by Turkey in this energy chessboard.


Turkey: Striving for Becoming an Energy Hub

“Turkey has ambitions to become a major Eurasian energy hub. Better connections with supplier countries and energy consumers would not only increase Turkey’s geopolitical standing. They would also bring lucrative business, in the form of transit fees or through new refineries, LNG terminals and trading facilities. And they could make it easier for Turkey to diversify its own energy supplies and to re-export any surplus gas it may have. In many ways, Turkey already fulfils the role of an energy hub. It does so through the Bosphorus straits and through several new pipelines that link itself to Russia and the Caspian region” Katinka Barysch (2007: 2). Within the context of dependency, Turkey, as an important

candidate to play a role of a transit route for the diversification of energy supply stands out as a key player. It does not have the potential to contribute to the European efforts to diversify supply, but also has its own agenda of raising its geostrategic profile by cooperating with global and local actors.

The end of the Cold War provided Turkey with windows of opportunity for Central Asia and the Caspian region both to fill the power gap and to fill new pipelines toward Europe. Encouraged by the West and especially by the US in the immediate post-Cold War (Winrow, 2001: 234), Turkey headed attention to the energy-rich countries of the Caspian region in which has close cultural and historical ties. Additionally, this opportunity was perceived as a chance to turn Ceyhan port into a new Rotterdam. Ambitious goals of acting within a united Turkic world “from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” were passionately mentioned several times by leading political figures. Accordingly, Turkey funded TV channels, student exchanges, and cultural centres to utilise the “national kinship” ties with the newly independent “Turkic republics”. It also initiated Turkic Summit Meetings every year (Larrabee, 2011: 103-104). The problem was that the Turkish economy at that time, was suffering severely from its structural weaknesses and high levels of inflation which prevented Turkey from channelling necessary economic sources to those countries in order to act as the winner of the power struggle. With respect to the Turkey’s limited success in the region, it should also be noted that along with their strong ties with Russia, newly independent states’ concerns about potential “patronising” attitude of Turkey over them resulted in the link to be much weaker than it had been expected during the thorny years of the Cold War when the “Turkic world” had been under the USSR rule (Fuller, 2008: 133).

Figure 4. *Turkish Natural Gas Imports 2018-2019*



Source: mei.edu

Nevertheless, thanks to its fortunate about close location to the Middle East and the Caspian basin in which hold 70 percent of global oil and gas reserves. It has geographical advantage to play a role as key energy transit route, in other words becoming, an “energy hub” (Fuller, 2008: 86 and Mane-Estrada, 2006: 3784). However, it should also be noted that even though the joint declaration of the Turkey-EU High Level Energy Dialogue meeting of 2015 refers to Turkey as “a natural energy bridge and an energy hub between energy sources in the Middle Eastern and Caspian Regions and European Union (EU) energy markets”

(European Commission, 2015), first “bridge” and “hub” are not interchangeable concepts but rather quite different from each other and second, being a “hub” requires more than geopolitical positioning which is a key argument behind the criticism that such an approach by for instance, BOTAS or seen above even the EU Commission would be quite simplified and far from grasping the whole picture of requirements. Another problem is Turkey’s own inability to satisfy its energy needs and the necessity to limit its own dependence on the Russian resources which is around 80 to 90 percent in terms of oil and 65 percent in natural gas (Pamir, 2007: 255 and Pascu, 2006: 2). As a growing market and a booming economy, its energy demand raises 8 percent annually, further questioning the possible negative impacts of this dependency, increasingly requiring Turkey to find alternative resources and to encourage renewables, and if necessary, even nuclear energy about which Turkey already made substantial efforts. Thus, its desire to become the 4th artery of the European energy demand after Russia, Norway and Algeria will not only raise its profile internationally, but it will also help Turkey in satisfying its own energy needs and in reducing its over-dependency on imported energy. Within this context, as a component frequently mentioned by experts as a prerequisite of becoming an “energy hub”, Turkey’s Natural Gas Market Law of 2001 focused on the liberalization of energy market and urges that any company cannot import natural gas more than 20 percent of expected national consumption and thus, state-owned BOTAS should not be part of any new natural gas contract until its share diminish to 20 percent while on the other hand private companies increase their shares and as of 2017 the natural gas imported by private companies were still only around 22 percent (Austvika and Rzayeva, 2017: 540). In order to become an energy hub, “extensive infrastructure, developed pipeline network, refineries, storage facilities, gas liquefaction points, regasification terminals and petrochemical units” are also essential and Turkey’s performance in this picture does not seem so impressive so far especially with a far less developed storage capacity and pipeline network for the time being to become an energy hub (Winrow, 2011: 82). So whether Turkey can become an energy hub is a question way beyond the mere geographic location and such a goal would be demanding much more effort, time and possibly regulations on Turkey’s part.

SOME MAJOR PROJECTS IN TERMS OF THE REALISATION OF TURKEY’S DESIRE TO ACT AS AN ENERGY HUB

BTC and BTE: The Major Legs of the East-West Energy Corridor in the Immediate Post-Cold War Era

One of the major embodiments of the energy role played by Turkey is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The project, called as the “Deal of the Century” is one of the main legs of the East-West Energy Corridor and enjoyed a serious amount of support by the United States. The intergovernmental agreement on the project was signed in 1999 and US was one of the signatories as was the case in the Memorandum of Understanding with Kazakhstan in 2001 (BTC Project) (Bilgin, 2007: 6389). The pipeline is the second longest oil pipeline after the famous Russian-governed Druzhba (Friendship) Pipeline. 1768-km pipeline which became operational in 2006 carries up to 1 million barrels per day (Tekin and Williams, 2011: 149 and Baran, 2005: 108). The strength of the

pipeline was reinforced with the participation of Kazakhstan after a Kazakh-Azerbaijani agreement on the flow of crude oil from Kashagan field to Baku starting from 2009 (Bilgin, 2007: 6389-6390). The pipeline also implies that the Iranian role is constrained in energy supply and has a symbolic importance that Russian monopoly over oil transportation was targeted successfully for the first time. Additionally, the pipeline strengthens the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia from Russian hinterland while also promoting a closer relationship between these states and Europe (Cornell et al., 2005: 24).

Thanks to the pipeline, Turkey could significantly increase its transit revenues, improved its facilities in the port of Ceyhan, and prevented the Bosphorus which already carries 7 percent of oil trade in the world (Pamir, 2007: 251) to be overused which could end up an ecological disaster (Mitchell et al., 1996: 80-81 and Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005: 151). According to Mike Bilbo, director of communications and external affairs for BP in Turkey, “This is one of those turning points in history. It changed the picture for Turkey overnight” (Kuser, 2006).

Quite similar features were shared by its natural gas equivalent, namely the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline. Similarly, BTE was the first non-Gazprom export route of the Caspian gas from the Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005: 156). The pipeline is the first part of the transportation of the Caspian gas to Western Europe through Turkey or in other words of the East-West natural gas energy corridor and a significant part of the “dream project” of Trans Caspian Gas Project supported by Turkey and the US (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2008: 182). The pipeline is also called as the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and carries up to 8.8 bcma natural gas since its operationalization in 2006 (Tekin and Williams, 2011: 150). In terms of natural gas it would be a fair argument that carrying natural gas westwards has been the key to Turkey’s energy profile within the context of energy politics and thus the paper will now touch upon firstly Nabucco pipeline and then TANAP and the recent “Turkish Stream”.

The Nabucco as a Showcase of the European Inability to Devise an Economically Feasible Common Energy Policy

The 3800-km pipeline passing through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and terminates at Austria has expected to carry up to 31 bcma natural gas and became operational in 2014. Nabucco could have been supplied 5-10 percent of the EU’s natural gas consumption in 2020. The project was backed by the US and the EU. For instance, while the Intergovernmental Agreement was signed, EU Commission President Barroso, EU Commissioner for Energy Piebalgs and US Special Envoy for Eurasia Richard Morningstar were present. Barroso defined the project as a “truly European project” (Tekin and Williams, 2011: 156). By Piebalgs, the pipeline was named as the “embodiment of a common European energy policy” (Norling, 2007: 7). Listing of the pipeline as a priority object by the European Commission in both 2006 and 2007, the appointment of van Aartsen as special co-ordinator of the Nabucco project and the decision to provide €200 million to the pipeline were other indications of the strong European support for the project. This was the first time the Commission financially supports a pipeline construction (Larrabee, 2011: 114). Accordingly,

the initial feasibility study of the Nabucco in 2004 was paid by the EU (Barysch, 2007: 6).

Barysch points out a significant debate on the pipeline about its capacity. As it was argued above, the pipeline would satisfy only 5 to 10 percent of the EU's total natural gas consumption. While this amount raises questions, she uses a quote from an energy expert: "If Nabucco prompted Russia to reduce its prices as little as €1 per thousand cubic meters, then- even if not a single cubic meter of gas ever flowed through Nabucco- it would provide a good return on its €5 billion investment". Other than its role as the major alternative route linking the Caspian resources to Europe, the project was also a test case for the EU to imply a common energy policy. Moreover, Nabucco could have shown the advantages of cooperation for Turkey and the EU in an era that they have some difficulties in their bilateral negotiations (Barysch, 2007: 4-5).

However, the commissioning of the Nabucco faced major obstacles and difficulties. First and probably the most important one was to find reliable physical supply to fill the pipeline. Azerbaijani gas could fall short to do so on its own and additionally Caspian or Middle Eastern participation was required. Even though there was the possibility of the Iraqi, Egyptian and Iranian gas to fill the pipeline, the question here is the Western reluctance to even name Iran as a potential supplier due to the Iranian nuclear programme dispute. Prospects were not brighter with respect to the political circumstances in the post-war Iraq and post-Arab Spring Egypt as other potential supply points. The agreement between Turkey and Iran on the production in the South Pars field in 2007 was a major Turkish step to overcome the difficulty which is faced with strong US opposition anyway (Barysch, 2007: 5). The question of Iran is also a major issue that may deter Western investors including European Investment Bank and EBRD (Norling, 2007: 35-36). Another concern is the possibility of terrorist attacks which could have affected the European energy consumption plans dramatically (Liuhto, 2009: 117). European concerns about the leverage that would be achieved by Turkey with the pipeline without concluding the membership process is another difficulty (Barysch, 2007: 6 and Liuhto, 2009: 117).

Among the Russian responses to the efforts of operationalising the Nabucco pipeline, to "convince" particular EU members was a basic feature. For instance, Russia promised an extension of the Blue Stream pipeline to Hungary and used its close relationship with OMV of Austria and ENI of Italy (Barysch, 2007: 5-6). Russia's close relationship with Germany might be an important reason behind Schroder's comment on Nabucco as a "non-sense" project (Norling, 2007: 16) and Merkel's opposition to the direct funding of the project by the European Commission (Socor, 2009). Moreover, Schroder also helped Putin's lobbying efforts to materialise South Stream project as a Russian counter-move against the Nabucco (Lough, 2011: 11). Russian efforts to promote its project and to limit the resources to flow into the Nabucco as in the case of the 2007 agreements (Klare, 2008: 112-113) with the major suppliers along with the deals Gazprom secured with the major players of the Nabucco project such as Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary (Tekin and Williams, 2011: 183) were quite wise steps on the part of Russia to push Nabucco to failure.

Lastly, Turkey's discomfort with its request to use some of the natural gas carried

through the pipeline for its domestic energy demand played an important role in the project's failure. Turkey demanded opening of the energy chapter in its negotiations with the EU and to be able to use 15 percent of natural gas carried by the pipeline for its raising domestic demand (Okumus, 2013) which poses another challenge to the EU's energy security, too, as the key transit route, if it continues to be dependent on the Russian resources to the extent it currently depends. As the last blow to the pipeline, The Shah Deniz Consortium's choice of transporting the Shah Deniz II field's natural gas via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), running from Kipoi in Greece to Italy through Albania and the Adriatic Sea rather than the projected Nabucco pipeline required another pipeline between the two points which brings us to the Trans Anatolia Pipeline (TANAP) project. This decision was a serious blow to not only Nabucco project, but also to the Nabucco West which was designed to replace Nabucco with a shorter pipeline and relatively low transportation capacity which was projected to transport natural gas to Baumgarten region of Austria following the route Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (Sonmez et al., 2013: 814-820). Thus, to a great extent, TANAP became the only remaining alternative to replace the failed Nabucco and to act as the "missing link" between the Caspian resources and TAP.

Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Change of Plans in the South Stream Pipeline

The Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is the recent ambitious natural gas transportation project, developed primarily by Azerbaijan and Turkey which would act as a part of Southern Gas Corridor (Guliyev, 2014) and the "missing link" between the Shah Deniz field and TAP. As the date pointing to the kick-off of the project, December 24, 2011 can be considered when the agreement on the project was signed between the Energy Ministers of the two countries. In terms of its stakeholders, Turkey's BOTAS holds 30 percent of stakes whereas Azerbaijan's SOCAR holds 58 percent (Karakelle, 2014). As the only European party, BP decided to join the project by buying 12 percent of stakes which it bought from SOCAR. The pipeline will pass 1800 kilometres within the borders of Turkey, cutting through 21 cities. The construction of the pipeline will start in 2015 and expected completion date is 2018 in order for the pipeline to start delivery to Europe in 2019 (Melville, 2014). The pipeline will transport 16 bcma in 2019 of which 6 bcma will be used for Turkey's own energy demand, an important achievement for Turkey considering its refused demand in the Nabucco project with respect to domestic use of a certain portion of the flow. A gradual increase in the project's capacity is also projected. Accordingly, the pipeline is expected to carry about 21 to 24 bcma in 2023 and 31 bcma in 2026 (Yilmaz and Kilavuz, 2012). In terms of Turkey's natural gas demand, it should be noted that while Turkey pays \$585 to Iran per a thousand cubic meters of natural gas and \$400 to Russia, it pays \$330 to Azerbaijan (Rzayeva) which is another major financial advantage of the project for Turkey, considering its growing energy demand.

Figure 5. TANAP Pipeline



Source: botas.gov.tr

Whereas TANAP represents a significant step toward Turkey's goal to becoming regional energy hub, but there are still some concerns about the project. One of the problems with the project is, as a basically Turkey-Azerbaijan joint project, its lack of multilateral cooperation as opposed to the failed Nabucco project. Moreover, the absence of EU acquis-oriented institutional and legal framework is another point that is in stark contrast to the Nabucco project that was completely under the EU law (Tagliapietra, 2014). As a last point, with the exception of BP after the exit of E.ON and Total from TAP due to their economic concerns about the stagnant energy demands of Greece, Albania, and Italy there is no European energy firm within the consortium. This absence of European partners is particularly noteworthy considering the perception of the Russian-backed South Stream's project as much more economically beneficial project with a route composed of relatively energy-hungry destinations (Naturalgasworld.com, 2014).

However, TANAP is still strongly supported by the EU. Thanks to its potential to become an important part of EU's energy security efforts in the near future in spite of the above-mentioned concerns about the project, The European Commission welcomed the Shah Deniz Consortium's choice of TANAP and ruled out the Nabucco pipeline by referring to it as being "not feasible" (Okumus, 2013). Moreover, the then President of the European Commission Barroso, as a sign of the European support to TANAP and highlighting the importance of the project for Europe, sent a video message to the inauguration of the project to display the EC's support (Jarosiewicz, 2014). Moreover, the EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger welcomed the project as the first direct link between the EU and the Caspian basin "Commissioner Oettinger welcomes TANAP gas pipeline agreements", 2012).

In order to evaluate the significance of the pipeline, comparisons should be made between TANAP and other natural gas pipelines on the field and its capacity should be assessed in the light of the current facts of East-West energy transportation. One of the most important pipelines between Russia and the West, the Yamal pipeline carries around 33 bcma and the Nord Stream, 55bcma. Overall,

Gazprom's flow of natural gas accounts for almost 37 percent of the European consumption as of 2019 (Soldatkin, 2019).). Additionally, it should be noted that 33 percent of the energy consumption of the EU is met by the EU members which accounts for 170-180 bcma. Non-Russian resources are also an important part of the EU's energy consumption with Norway and Algeria only providing almost one third of the EU's energy consumption. Assessing TANAP's ambitious 31 bcma capacity which is expected to be reached in 2026 in the light of these facts and figures, its importance goes without saying at least in limiting the Russian share in the EU's energy consumption which could push down Russia after Norway in terms of natural gas suppliers which might help the EU in case of future Russian interest-driven crisis with subsequent energy cut-offs and pricing revisions. Its even more ambitious projected capacity of 60 bcma (Evgrashina, 2012) in the future is more than the Nord Stream's capacity. Putting aside the evaluation of how realistic such a capacity is, probably more importantly, it also shows the expectations about the future participation of other Caspian countries as well as the Middle Eastern resources. Thus, CEO of SOCAR Turkey, Kenan Yavuz's reference to the project as a "matter of security for the EU" (Karakelle, 2014) seems fair enough.

Figure 6. *Nord Stream Pipelines*




Source: bbc.com

The recent Russian cancellation of the South Stream and renaming of the pipeline as the "Turkish Stream", as announced by Vladimir Putin in late 2014 in Ankara during his visit, which would transport the same amount of natural gas, 63 bcma, not to Europe via its proposed route, but rather to Turkey seems striking within this context. Putin declared that the work on the project will be halted and the amount will be transported via Turkish-Greek border rather than using Bulgarian route. Thus, this decision was thought to increase the amount of natural gas that passes through Turkey by 63 bcma (Bbc.com, 2014a and Theguardian.com, 2018), before the project was downsized and agreed upon two pipelines carrying 15.75 bcma each -as opposed to the first plan of having only one

line of 15.75 bcma-, summing up to a still ambitious 31.5 bcma. Considering the ultimate capacity prospect of TANAP which is 60 bcma and this 31.5 bcma, the amount Turkey will be able to transit after its own consumption from these supplies will account for more than one-seventh of the EU's natural gas demand (currently around 550 bcma) if they reach their full potential.

Figure 7. Turkish Stream



Source: balkaneu.com

Thus, Turkey now has the potential to play the role of the “key Eurasian energy hub” more than ever, carrying out both the EU-backed projects and Russia-backed projects in accordance with its interest-driven calculations, making itself an invaluable partner for both actors’ energy-related policies. As long as Turkey keeps its commitment to delicate steps on this energy chessboard, meaning that it maintains a healthy contact with both the EU and Russia without alienating either side due to the projects it participates in, also thanks to diminishing trust in Ukraine as a transit point due to political instability, in the medium to long-run, it might have the chance to raise its profile in the foreseeable future. It should however, be noted that while the Turkish dimension is as such, with the Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream, Russia would further deepen its key supplier role and European dependence by seriously damaging the diversification efforts of the EU and succeeding in isolating Ukraine to a great extent. And in that context it is noteworthy that underlying the divergences within Europe, Gazprom succeeded in signing a shareholders agreement on Nord Stream 2 with E.ON, BASF, Shell, ENGIE and OMV (Siddi, 2017: 112), the key Western European energy companies, showing the East-West divide on diversification efforts too within Europe itself.

CONCLUSION

Within the context of the trilateral energy game, the Russian position is the clearest one with the aim of enhancing Russian global profile through strategic use of energy politics. The EU’s profile is more complicated due to its suffering from internal disagreements and frequent triumph of national interests of individual member state. For instance Glachard, on this point, had argued that “the [EU]

market has borders that are not Europeanised. Each country treats its border with a third country as a national border. When Spain wants to interconnect with Morocco and negotiates tariffs, investments, rules of access etc., they are doing EU external energy policy but they do it on a national basis. It's the case everywhere in EU. This cannot work anymore.” (Energy Post, 2015) Probably, the most delicate role is and will be played by Turkey. While on the one hand Turkey is the target of different supplier and importer interests as an inevitable transit route, on the other hand, it has to be quite cautious in its steps in order not to antagonise one of these actors in order to both play the “energy hub” role successfully in the future and to satisfy its own growing energy needs. Turkey’s continuing efforts to operationalise the East-West energy corridor via its territory while at the same time its nuclear deal with Russia and increasing trade volumes in addition to green light to both Blue Stream 2 and cancelled South Stream - of which importance for Turkey’s transit role dramatically increased with the Russian decision to move its transport line in a way that passes through Turkey rather than Bulgaria which would have the potential to add Turkey’s transit role a huge amount of 31.5 bcm which is, besides Nord Stream 2- by itself quarter of the amount Gazprom carries to European countries excluding Turkey - are showcases of this delicate act of balancing between the two actors. Nevertheless, in case LNG imports keep increasing in Europe whereas booming gas demands of Asia surpasses European demand significantly, then Turkey’s long term goal of becoming an energy hub would significantly suffer. Otherwise, with a highly pragmatic and pro-active approach as in the case of the realisation of TANAP project while simultaneously strengthening its energy relationship with Russia, Turkey seems to pursue a wise strategy as an actor which reinvented its significance for both actors in terms of energy politics. In this delicate trilateral game, probably the best policy for Turkey, in line with its ambitious goal of becoming an energy hub and aside from the required internal reforms, to pursue can be derived from the words of Henry Temple Palmerson who served as the British Prime Minister between 1855 and 1865: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow” (Heath, 1969: 39).

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**A DIGITAL LABOR STORE:
FLEXIBLE TIME TECHNOPARK SAMPLE**

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to reveal the dimensions of exploitation that has lost its visibility in the flexible working arrangement created by new capitalism, and the relentless race initiated by man with “time”. In this context, the research focusing on the fact that technoparks are one of the places where digital labor is most intensely confessed, focuses on the Erciyes Technopark sample. Semi-structured interviews have been conducted with ten technopark employees who were asked eight questions. Interviews have been conducted in January 2019, and the recorded interviews have been analyzed using qualitative content analysis method. The findings show that people who find themselves under flexible working have difficulties in catching up with “time”; to compromise oneself, life, family, environment and labor in order to be faster, more efficient and more productive, and consent to all this without their consent.

Keywords: Digital labor, Technopark, Labor, New Capitalism, Flexible time.

INTRODUCTION

“Digital labor” is one of the most controversial concepts in the “network society” we live in, and the least discussed as a result of the invisibility it has gained. Everything, that finds its place on the planet, which turns into a huge factory, is a tool that is accepted as part of the interchange commoditized by the capital structure.

In today’s “network” jailed world, internet users are exploited based upon the content and virtual existence they produce. The extent of exploitation is much more serious than before as a result of the user’s role as a consumer, especially in the social media, this time in the production phase and to provide an image free from any restrictions, obligations, and control that make him feel exploited, as well as the disappearance of both time and space. “The space-time of capitalism is not fixed but variable” (Harvey, 2015: 52); this variability accelerates and transforms with the development in technology.

Contrary to what is believed, Fuchs (2015: 15), who thinks that social media pro-consumption does not mean “digital labor”, but it is only a part of it, and he emphasizes the need to expand the term “digital labor” to include all forms of paid and unpaid labor required for the existence, production, dissemination and use of digital media, and he invites to understand the importance of examining “the mobility of capital, international exploitation mechanisms, exploitation and working conditions in software fields, the discussions of the labor of internet and social media users as a whole”.

Undoubtedly, in capitalist societies, whether they qualify as “blue collar” or “white collar”, every worker is obliged to add extra labor time to the continuation of the dominant class holding the means of production, to the necessary labor time to keep himself alive.

DIGITAL LABOR

The forces that form the mission of being self-productive within the capitalist production relations are the tools of an exploitation-intensive policy that enables the production of more products produced in the normal time, increasing the surplus value, and thus making more profit, without the need for additional time.

Man is a productive entity by nature, and always tries to find a way to make livelihoods to survive, meet human needs and produce usage values that will meet the needs of others. There is no doubt that what gains importance here is the “use value”. Because, according to Marx, the concept of “labor” must have a usage value in order to gain real value. This is the moment when this “use value” turns into “exchange value”, when labor falls victim to a capitalist process. Of course, it is neither the production nor the consumption phase that ensures the continuation of the process, this is undoubtedly the ingenuity of the “circulation”. The “labor”, which could no longer save itself from commodification and found itself under the domination of the market, has already lost its feature of being unique; It became invisible in the homogeneous mixture.

The world, which has abandoned the traditional structure and embraced modern life, as Ritzer (2000: 135) stated, has lost the old magic it has; capitalist capital

has had to act with the urge to make attempts that will immediately affect and enchant people against such a world. Each capitalist initiative has forced man to work harder, and the belief that the only way to survive has brought the idea to work harder. When such a way of working, which depicts the Fordist form of administration, has to be renewed in the face of the changing world, the Post-Fordist form of administration has manifested itself, and this time the masses have found themselves under a new control under the concept of “flexible time”. Based on the proposition of Hardt and Negri, the necessity to characterize this transformation in the form of production and management as the postmodernization of the economy manifests itself. As a matter of fact, according to them, imperialism on which the power of the modern world is based to establish the central and hierarchical structure has become a concept that needs to be renewed with the change in the economy (Hardt and Negri, 2003: 262-263). The transformation of the capitalist mode of production and management gave birth to the foundation of the empire. Empire is the dominant structure in the world that puts the flexible working system into practice with its decentralized management style, where time and space constraints have lost their importance by providing the global spread of “flexible capitalism”, which is sometimes seen as “new capitalism” and sometimes “late capitalism” or “contemporary capitalism” in the literature (Hardt and Negri, 2003: 17). It is seen that this dominant structure was built due to the nature of the changing political power in the “new world consisting of communication networks and where people, money, and ideas are in a global flow” (Gilbert, 2012: 227).

The exploitation seen in here is undoubtedly much more dangerous than the other one; because, in this way of working, it does not seem to offer a certain time and place condition, but at first glance, the limits of the control have expanded enough to lose its visibility. Hardt and Negri explain the post-Fordist mode of production that came to life with the new capitalism with the concept of “biopolitical production” and characterize the labor that forms the product as “immaterial labor” (Hardt and Negri, 2003: 303). According to Castells (2005: 99), this new economy is informational and global and based on network organization. Unlike manual labor, the existence of mental work is encountered in the biopolitical production form where informational, communicative, digital, more generally intangible labor is on the scene. In the biopolitical order to which this difference has led, especially in the name of being able to control labor, people no longer need 24 hours between the four walls to work. In new capitalism, the best place to work is “anywhere”; and the best time is “always”.

The world of today, which is the proof of Marx’s righteousness saying that “everything that is solid is evaporating”; it is a fair determination that it is a new version of a “capitalist society” hidden behind definitions such as “information society”, “network society”. The main institutional structure is also the market here, and the ultimate goal is to expand the borders of a global world market. Likewise, the ideology called “globalization” is where “capital is internationalized, moves freely and rapidly, and there is the most plunder financial speculation worldwide” (Wood, 2016: 150) and it is a period, a system, and it does not like drawing a boundary to the market.

According to Fuchs (2015), where it can be easily seen that Marx regarded labor as a “modern form of activity under the rule” and it is perceived as the labor related to all kinds of Information and Communication Technologies industry in

the light of his theory of labor-value as “digital slavery”; the place where values and commodities are produced, everywhere; time is any moment. As a matter of fact, according to him again; it is also necessary to consider the workers of mining workers working in mines that are raw materials in the production of communication tools. Software workers in India and Silicon Valley, Foxconn workers in China, who made a name for themselves with their employees who committed suicide as the producers of digital labor. Inspired by Fuchs (2020: 177), it is possible to say that there is a dialectical relationship between labor and technology as the subject and object of production.

ALIENATION

“Working”, which has features of a historical and social product, has been perceived from a different perspective and has been constantly changed termly. It is an undeniable fact that in this capitalist order, where the formation of certain and necessary conditions is no longer possible, it is not possible to talk about an alienated work that individual can realize himself; “digital labor” is also an alienated “digital work”. As such, referring to the concept of “alienation” also stands as a necessity.

According to Hegel, the concept of “alienation”, which has been systematized by Hegel for the first time and became theoretical from Marx’s point of view; “is about the forming of existence in a dialectical process” (Tekin, 2014: 30). Marx, on the other hand, is concerned with worker, product and labor in the subject of “alienation”. Marx, who advises himself, the society, the production process, the economy, to the foreigner to avoid being a slave of the object, on the other hand, emphasizes that “alienation” manifests itself in the relations of production in which man has to sell his labor power (Fromm, 2004: 85). For Marx, who sees “the commodity as a fetish” as one of the most unique aspects of capitalism and places it at the center of his analysis, expresses this alienation of capitalism as a “value” concept (Amin, 2017: 72).

The foreign attitude of the product that emerges as a result of labor to the producer makes it a tool in the hands of the power against its producer. In this way, while labor give birth to an alienated property, on the other hand, property becomes foreign to self-producing, and becomes dominant in labor. As a matter of fact, “the life given by human to objects confronts him like a foreigner and an enemy” (Marx, 1964: 169-170. As cited in. Berger, 2014: 59). It is precisely here that giving Marx’s right to Marx is a proper attitude: “The increase in the world of things is directly proportional to the decrease in the world of people.”

The unconditional acceptance of the necessity of sacrificing the life, character, and self that modern man wishes to have in order to sustain the life offered to him/her is sufficient to portray “alienation”. As a matter of fact, it is possible to read such alienation in Fritz Pappenheim’s (2002) analogy inspired by Goya’s “*A caza de dentes*” (Out Hunting for Teeth). According to Pappenheim (2002), who sees the state of humanity faced with alienation as a figure of the modern age in the woman who tries to remove the teeth from the corpse because of her superstition that she has a magical power in the teeth of the hunged-man in the painting; since she does not have the courage to face the real face of the corpse, the woman who insists on carrying out the action she believes should be done

by holding a handkerchief by holding a handkerchief between her own face and the man's face stands before us as a picture of wear.

While the transformation of the tradition of disciplining human, labor and society peculiar to the modern period into a practice of keeping under control in the postmodern period results in the deepening of surveillance, the flexibility of time and space offered in working life is known as a lifeline to cover up control, surveillance, and alienation. Thanks to the “digital” adjective before the concept of “labor” as per the conditions of the period; It is evident that the capitalist capital structure allows it to create a new and wide area of exploitation, and to make alienation dominant with a more invisible and so-called smiling face mask.

TECHNOPARK

“Technopark” (Technology Development Zone) is “an enterprise based on incentives and ownership with management function that has relation with one or more universities or other higher education institutions and research centers on an official or activity basis, also designed to encourage the establishment and development of industrial companies based on information and advanced technologies, and has a management function that will provide support to tenant companies in technology transfer and business administration” according to International Science Parks Association (IASP). Although continually offers successful stories in the light of words such as “progress”, “development”, “innovation”, “invention”, technopark is a place where employees, the creators of “digital labor”, who are overwhelmed with factors such as long working hours, overtime, intense stress and competition and find themselves in a permanent exploitation ring, unwittingly devote to their lives and as Sennett states a place where they even wear their own character. According to Habermas, who does not think very differently from Sennett, cognitive capitalism colonizes life (Peters and Bulut, 2014: 32).

“The world of people becomes worthless in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things; labor does not only produce commodities, it also produces itself and the worker as a commodity and realizes this as much as it produces commodities” (Marx, 1969: 67. As cited from Okutan, 2006: 51). To say that technoparks are a serious exploited warehouse where the high-level qualities are devalued and put into ordinariness, the system of irregularity is used with the mentality of expense and income, and that the feeling of working in a temporary position is always kept alive in the hearts.

Technoparks are more than just a place of production, thanks to the “flexible (new) capitalism” which feeds them, the “technology employees” that it incorporates essentially cause them to lose control of their own lives, to be established right in the middle of a life kneaded with anxiety, and even to see their life as a tool.

In “new capitalism”, which stands before us as an “illegible power regime”, it is nothing more than a kind of eye-wash that the old control mechanisms are eliminated and substitute for more control possibilities than before.

THE AIM OF THE RESEARCH

Emphasizing that labor can reach the quality of being productive only by producing its own opposite, Marx (1979: 392) mentions that it works in capital production by undertaking the duty of a vehicle. The aim of this study is to draw attention to the fact that digital labor is in the service of capital production in the same way despite all the cute, attractive appearance.

In the research, Erciyes Technopark which works under the slogan “Growing Turkey’s Technology Base” is the subject of case analysis. Science parks where technological devices surrounding the world are designed are handled in Erciyes Technopark, focusing on exploitation, which is inherent in the study and the conditions are easier.

The study, which started with the slogan “the reward of labor is never the equivalent of the amount of labor”, aims to prove how “new capitalism” establishes speed-oriented work in the middle of human life, based on the narratives of technology workers who devote their lives to the global mindset.

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

Semi-structured interview technique has been used in the study based on field research. In the study where eight different companies operating in Kayseri Erciyes Technopark constitute the research universe, face to face interviews have been conducted with ten technopark employees. The texts that emerged as a result of the meetings held in Kayseri in January 2019 have been analyzed using qualitative content analysis.

Content analysis, which is one of the qualitative research techniques, as Gunter says, may be a reason for preference not only for the purpose of dealing with quantitative data, but also for the analysis and interpretation of thoughts, expressions and opinions (2000: 55-56). As Kerlinger (1986) has stated, although content analysis is a technique that is used for help because of its three features such as being systematic, objective and measurable; in-depth interview is one of the techniques used regularly for the analysis of social reality. Thanks to this technique, a symbolic representation of a kind of social reality is created according to Merten and Teipen (1991. As cited from Gunter, 2000: 57). From this point of view, content analysis is an important tool used in recording social reality when it is carried out through in-depth interview and transferred to the text (Merten, 1996: 65).

Selection of employees from software experts to entrepreneurship coordinator, company owner to project team leader from different taskers allowed the research to be more inclusive and to obtain more accurate findings. On the other hand, the scales have been also taken into consideration during the selection of companies; small-scale companies as well as large, multi-employee companies are included in the research. Table 1 provides brief information about the interviews.

Table 1. Interview List

	Company	Speaker	Duty	Interview Date
1	A1	X1	Entrepreneurship Coordinator	08.01.2019
2	A2	X2	Accountant	08.01.2019
3	A3	X3	Company owner	09.01.2019
4	A4	X4	Programmer	08.01.2019
5	A5	X5	Business partner	08.01.2019
6	A6	X6	Project Team Leader	14.01.2019
7	A7	X7	Academician	14.01.2019
8	A8	X8	Computer engineer	14.01.2019
9	A8	X9	Computer engineer	14.01.2019
10	A8	X10	Computer engineer	14.01.2019

Source: Author's data from interviews

Eight open and closed-ended questions have been asked to those whose views have been consulted. The answers for the interview questions, "How many hours of a day do technopark employees spend working? Are the weekends counted within work programs? Is it possible to talk about a concept of shift in technoparks? How is the working time planning done, and by whom? If there is a flexible way of working, what does this flexibility make the employee feel? Is there enough time for the plans and the works to be done? So, do you ever wish that a day is 48 hours? As a person who works hard, can you say that I can afford everything in life?" have been sought, the data obtained as a result of the analysis have been collected under eight titles, and this article has been written.

The interview questions were prepared in order to examine the place of the subject covered in the research in the literature, to determine the problem, and to provide a response in practice from one point. That the exploitation awareness of employees with flexible time, and the capitalist management style, which has evolved from discipline to control by referring to the concept of "biopolitical production" in the literature, is almost a living proof by losing control of their own lives in revealing the side that deals with the production of lives rather than products is one of the factors that determine the questions. In the study based on the semi-structured interview technique, the expressions of the speakers without questions were also found noteworthy. Collecting the findings under eight headings was realized as a result of combining the answers to the questions and the common thoughts conveyed by the interviewees.

FINDINGS

Findings revealed as a result of field research show that digital labor producers are incapable of "time", find themselves in the mood that only a defeated warrior can understand, and cannot catch up the time that flows.

Flexible-time Understanding Becoming a Resident Culture in Technopark

One of the first findings of the study in the field research has been that the flexible-time understanding became a culture established in Technopark. Although it is

seen that the technoparks offered to the employees as a place where a flexible working system generally exists, it is observed that there is an average of 10 hours of active working per day between 08.30-18.30 in particular. While these hours represent the compulsory working time, it is not at all difficult to talk about a flexible-time understanding of 20 hours based on the answers received on the basis of interviews.

Each company determines their working time within itself. If I speak for my own company, we spend 16-20 hours a day working. (X3)

Working as a Process Taking Holidays In

It is also among the findings that Erciyas Technopark employees partly include Saturdays in their work programs. In particular, it is understood that the employees who find themselves in an even more intense work when the delivery date of the products approaches, not only include the weekend in their programs, but also continue working at night.

When we get close to the last delivery and installation day of the product, we need to continue working at night and even at the weekend so that we can finish the works. Because even seconds affect the factory. (X1)

Is it Possible to Talk about a Concept of Shift in Technoparks?

Based on the findings obtained from the field research, it is possible to mention the existence of a flexible working style in technoparks; however, there is also an obligatory working hour application. This data makes the researchers think that there is both an average of 10 hours of the day and working hours under the name of “flexibility” in which the rest of the day is spent.

In a system like this, one feels that the job should be finished as soon as possible. We focus on work, not on time. (X7)

Working Time Planning

In the picture that we see as a common thought as much as possible to reach a general opinion; although there is a situation where every employee perceives that s/he is making her/his own work plan himself, it is seen that the working time planning is actually done by the company owner or the product manager. Because each employee is acting knowing that whenever there are some jobs that need to be finished, s/he should not leave the workplace before finishing, s/he should end the job. Such flexible working time schedules are individualized charts that change from day to day, and thanks to this type of planning, the argument is developed that employees have the chance to get out of routine time and work as free individuals.

Depending on the job given, the duration is determined. The time the work takes determines the cost. (X4)

The planning done by the owner of the company takes the form of a business plan according to the expertise field of the people. We determine the numbers by dividing them into hours and days. (X5)

Flexible Work Masking Capitalism Exploitation

As a result of the contribution made by technology thanks to its role as “supporting force of dominant power” in the age we are in, one of the adjectives received by capitalism appears as “flexible”. The best way to hide the exploitation of flexible (new) capitalism is undoubtedly the “free” atmosphere offered to people that they can create their own working conditions and thus decide how their lives can take shape by opposing strict bureaucratic practices. The thing that makes us think that exploitation is much more invisible and deep than before is the nature of the liberating effect offered as an advantage that have infiltrated much more into life, rather than the old forms of control of flexible capitalism. New and flexible structures of power produced over the individual lead to “character wear” as Sennett (2008) points out.

Flexibility makes the employee feel free from feeling stuck. Having a clean mind feels good to get the job out. However, flexible work is not working less, but it is working more. I have been working in this business for 19 years. When a person prefers to work for a long time, others start to work like this; then this kind of working principle becomes the general character. (X2)

This sector makes flexible work mandatory. No discipline. Employee feels free, comfortable, efficient. (X5)

You work in the period when people work, or vice versa. We are people who also work at home. (X1)

I think anywhere where there is internet and computer is suitable for working. Continuing the project at home makes people feel free because there is no time limit. (X9)

A person working in a flexible environment becomes more productive. A comfortable, effective head... (X8)

The Race of Flexible Workers against “Time”

According to the understanding placed by the new capitalism, the fact that people do not trust the company they work leads to success, contrary to trusting, and in such an insecure, unfaithful environment, the individual finds a way to market himself by making more work plans. Sennett’s statement “the search for rebellion and flexibility against the bureaucratic routine produced new structures of power and control instead of creating conditions that would liberate us” undoubtedly mentions how the new order conquered the concept of “time” and speaks of the existence of an understanding that has taken on a much more destructive role than the “metric time” logic, in which the worker’s work can be calculated at a given moment in old capitalism.

There’s no time. We seem to be running after a train. (X5)

Of course there is no time. What is left over from work? I am married with a child. I miss homemade food. There is no time for a normal life. (X2)

Sleeping is the primary condition for me. This limits my goals. Socializing a little means giving up sleep. (X10)

Failure to Finish the Work in a Day Divided into 24 Hours

Looking at the organization of time in the workplace is the easiest way to understand what kind of regime is used to manage a company. In the light of the findings obtained as a result of interviews in this context Based on the technopark sample, which seems to be dominant in flexible working, today, “flexible organizations” are experimenting with variable timelines called “flex-time”. (Sennett, 2008: 59). In particular, it is possible to see that the company owners’ approach to flexibility sometimes reveals itself with striking statements.

I wish a day is not 48 hours, it is 72 hours (X3)

Sometimes I can do what I can do in 48 hours in 1 hour. Sometimes even 48 hours is not enough. People want an isolated working life. Even working on the computer all day is not as tiring as man. Now, in working life, speaking the same language is not enough to agree. (X2)

Alienation as a Result of Flexible Working

The expressions of the technopark employees, who stand in front of us as a clear proof of how work pushes people into isolation and alienation, draw a picture of man’s siege and expresses his helplessness on his way to the process of alienation to himself, then to his environment and ultimately to society.

I don’t have time for anything other than my family. There is no time even for the family. (X2)

No time. It’s just business. I feel relieved when I have the opportunity to listen to myself in the dark. The family factor takes people off. (X4)

There is work in the center of our lives. It is not possible to spare time for ourselves. Work covers our entire life. (X6)

I can’t spare time for anything other than work. Work encompasses my life. Then we become asocial. Then society no longer accepts us. (X5)

CONCLUSION

The findings obtained in the research have the quality to see that under flexible work, labor has undergone a greater exploitation and man has become a desperate spirit over time. During the interviews, it is witnessed that some employees who have been working under the same regime for many years are wormed out, but still have the belief that they need to work more; this testimony confirms the correctness of Fromm’s (2004: 86) view that the responsible one is the capital in the portrait drawn by the humanized and objectified person.

Employees who prefer a life away from “man” and close to “machine” and have the view that such a way of working offers more comfort to the person point out the destructive effect of business life on the human with this thought that they developed. It is impossible not to agree with Sennett’s opinion. Because this desperation and a dream of life less than human can bear carry traces from a serious “character wear” (Sennett, 2008).

It is not difficult to think that “no long term” slogan is shouted by an almost invisible voice at technoparks which consider ‘competition’ phenomenon, seen as one of the issues that Sennett emphasizes, as a driving force. This slogan, which erodes trust, loyalty and dependence, shows itself especially in ignoring the graying of the ‘family’ concept by employees.

As a result of the interviews conducted within the scope of the research; employees who are loyal to the idea that the family factor cuts the ties with the business express that neither their family nor themselves find time to work, while the term “siege” used by some is striking; because the owner of immaterial labor is aware that s/he devotes his/her life to “work”. One of the determining results of the research is the complaint of the labor owner, who seeks a remedy for 72 hours a day in the face of the blurring of the boundary between his working life and his non-working life that he lives in running, on “sleeping limits my goals”. Indeed, these results point to the existence of “alienation”.

It is one of the main defenders of the study that such findings as “*I think everywhere where there is a computer and internet is suitable for working*” proves that the idea that every place becomes a working space and every time becomes a working time together with flexible capitalism.

While the flexible-time technopark employees, who lost the flag to the time in their race, say “*we focus on work, not on time*” on the one hand, they do not hesitate to express their desperation as “*we are chasing the train*” with the impulse of being flesh and blood on the other hand. The statement “*Even the second affects the factory*” is striking in that it reveals the point reached by global capitalism and carries the traces of the deprivation of value of labor rather than being a mere finding.

As a result, it is seen that the technopark employees, who are able to gather around the view that flexibility offers them the opportunity to work free and to think originally, have complained about the 20 hours of work a day because they lose control of their lives and internalize the attitude “we are created for such working”. With this aspect, each of them turns into the current interpretation of the woman in Goya’s “*Out Hunting for Teeth*” painting.

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**WATER ISSUE IN CENTRAL ASIA:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

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ABSTRACT

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, gained their independence and faced the water issue, which was regulated by the Moscow administration before their independence. Water allocation and regulation are mainly based on the study of Barthold and the USSR Central Asian Department. During the Soviet Union, Central Asian water resources were used without considering the future of water sources and determined only to increase to cotton production of the central apparatus. In this context, the drying up of the Aral Sea is seen as one of the results of the implemented policies. The relations of the states, within the scope of the construction of Rogun Dam and Kambarata HPP 1 Dam, were analyzed through legal means under the water security. Since the research is qualitative, the case analysis method is selected for the evaluation of the collected data.

Keywords: USSR, Central Asia, Water Issue, Rogun Dam, Kambarata HPP 1.

INTRODUCTION

The Central Asian region has several environmental issues, including the drying of the Aral Sea, the reduction of river and irrigation water, low water levels, and other issues caused by the Soviet testing nuclear weapons in Semey (Kazakhstan) and the Chinese testing base in Lop Nor located at Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. However, among all the issues listed above, the most significant problem is seen as the water problem related to irrigated soils (Horsman, 2004: 69). Water resources are divided into three main parts due to the physical nature of the region. These sources respectively consist of surface flow formation zone (mountainous areas and upper basins in the south-east), water flow transition and spreading zone (middle part), and delta regions (in the northwest direction).

The water resources both on the surface and underground have a major effect as a limiting factor on the economic activities of the Central Asian region for development competing with environmental conditions. The largest rivers in the region mostly flow across borders and between states. The two largest rivers of the Central Asian region, Syr-Darya, and the Amu-Darya Rivers flow through Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Chu and Talas Rivers flow along with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, while the Tarim River flows along with the Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China borderlines (Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia, 2018).

Today, more than 40% of the Central Asian population does not have access to the piped water supply. It is anticipated that the need for access to the water resource shall increase in the coming years. Also, the population of the Central Asian region, which has a population of about 65 million as of now, is estimated to be increased by 20% in 2025 (Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva, 2015: 86). In addition to the need for water in the coming years, the Central Asian region has water-sharing problems. The improper distribution and over-allocation of water in the region, its economic importance, and the increasing need for water soon show that water shall remain a point of conflict between the states of the region (Horsman, 2004: 70).

The current water crisis stems from the policies applied to the region during the USSR period in the Central Asian region. The methods used in determining the administrative borders of the Central Asian states by the USSR administration and the increase in irrigation-based agriculture after the 1950s have caused the crisis that the Central Asian states face.

The technical solutions used in the negotiations mostly became the main element for the regulations on water allocation after the USSR period. Essentially, technical solutions are based on political and institutional designs. If the technical solutions are supported by the public and institutions, it shall create the conditions to reach consensus (Dobner and Frede, 2015: 86). In the light of this perspective, the main goal of this article is to examine the water issue in the Central Asian region in line with international conventions, bilateral and multilateral agreements and to analyze the opportunities and threats, which Central Asian countries may face within the framework of water security.

METHODOLOGY

As it is a qualitative research, the situation analysis method selected. The data, collected within the framework of the situation analysis, examined, and interpreted under the headings created at the beginning of the study. Personal observations and literature review were used for data collection. Within the scope of primary sources in research, the information compiled because of my personal observations and studies conducted while serving for the OSCE Office in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The data consisting of secondary sources consists of books, book chapters, articles, conference and seminar notices, news, interviews, electronic resources and documents and information from the website².

WATER SECURITY

Water is essential for the continuation of life and a basic need for health and hygiene along with being a tool for agriculture and energy. Water security is crucial when it comes to health, livelihoods, productive economies, ecosystems, and disaster risk reduction (USAID, 2020). In other words, water security means to strategically ensure water security, that is, the provision of sufficient quantity and quality of water to avoid major impacts from natural and man-made disasters (Rakhmanova, 2015: 6). Water security entails crop production, electric energy based on hydro sources and disagreement on the water allocation and delivery time as well as disaster of the Aral Sea in the Central Asian region (Sokolov, 2007: 5).

Water Security has a more formal definition during the second World Water Forum held at The Hague in March 2000. As an outcome of this meeting, the Ministerial Declaration, entitled “Water Security in the Twenty-First Century”, identified main principles to secure water related issues. Water security is defined to meet basic needs, to secure food supply, to protect ecosystems, to share water resources, to manage risks emerging water issues, to value water, to govern water allocation more justly and equitably (Wouters et al., 2009: 103). In conjunction with the above definition, water security encompasses the continuous use and protection of water systems, the measures against water-related hazards, maintaining the development of water resources with assuring water services for humans and the environment (Schultz and Uhlenbrook, 2008: 2). Despite the concept of water security is in the developmental phase, it is slowly taking its place in the legal framework (Wouters et al., 2009: 134).

² I served as a *Border Management Officer* between 2011 and 2013 in the border unit under the Politico-Military Department of OSCE Office in Tajikistan. From 2013 until 2014, I was *Acting Head of the Politico-Military Department* of the respective international organization. I was a *Consultant* to deliver Risk Assessment Training at the Turkmen-Afghan border for Turkmen Special Unit between March 2015 and May 2015 for OSCE Office in Turkmenistan.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques³

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) is a resolution to protect the environment in the event of armed conflict. It does not allow for unfriendly use of the environment as a justification for warfare. The ENMOD Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1976 and entered into force on 5 October 1978. Kazakhstan ratified the Convention on 25 April 2005, Kyrgyzstan on 15 June 2015, Tajikistan on 12 October 1999, while Uzbekistan did on 26 May 1993. According to Article I of the Convention, the use of prohibited techniques must meet the criteria stated in the text. The action taken by the state/s must aim at unfriendly purposes, cause destruction, damage, or injury to another State Party, and must have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The term prohibited techniques refer to any actions for modifying natural processes. It includes the dynamics, composition, and or structure of the hydrosphere (Wouters et al., 2009: 125).

UN Water Convention (Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes)

The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, known as the Water Convention, was adopted in Helsinki in 1992 and entered into force in 1996⁴. It is a unique international legal instrument, which aims to ensure the sustainable use of transboundary water resources through facilitating cooperation. It was initially negotiated as a European regional convention but then has been opened for accession to all UN Member States in 2016. According to the Convention, the parties bordering the even transboundary waters must cooperate through agreements and establishing joint mechanisms. The Convention defined common terminology to have a standard approach among all members. In this context, “Transboundary waters” defined “...any surface or ground waters that mark, cross, or are located on boundaries between two or more States...” while “Transboundary impact” explained as “...any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by human activity, the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area under the jurisdiction of another Party...”.

According to Article 2 “...the Parties of the convention shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, control, and reduce any transboundary impact, to ensure that transboundary waters are used with the aim of ecologically sound and rational water management, conservation of water resources and environmental protection...”. In line with the above-mentioned convention, if any disputes arise among the members, international water law offers a framework for the peaceful

³ Please refer to the following website for detailed information, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1978/10/19781005%2000-39%20AM/Ch_XXVI_01p.pdf

⁴ Please refer to the following website for detailed information, https://unece.org/DAM/env/water/publications/WAT_Text/ECE_MP.WAT_41.pdf

resolution of the differences (Wouters et al., 2009: 120). Essentially, UNECE Water Convention was an instrument to ensure transboundary waters are used in a reasonable and equitable way, considering its transboundary character. Kazakhstan ratified the Convention on 11 January 2001, Turkmenistan on 29 August 2012, and Uzbekistan 4 September 2007.

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses

The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, known as the UN Watercourses Convention, is an instrument that was adopted by the United Nations on 21 May 1997⁵. It provides guidelines for the usage of international watercourses, measures of protection, and preservation with management. It defined “Watercourse” to introduce a common approach in terms of handling it for negotiations. In the framework of the Convention, “Watercourse” defined as *“a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus”* while *“International watercourse”* and explained watercourse as *“parts of which situated in different States.”* It also provided guidelines for the agreement among the Watercourse States and implied the waters to be annexed to the agreement.

AT REGIONAL LEVEL

Agreement among the Central Asian Countries on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management on Utilization and Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources

The agreement was made among The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was related to coordination and organization solutions for joint management of interstate water resources and for further pursuing a coordinated policy in the interests of economic growth and promoting living standards as for the parties of the agreement. The Agreement is signed in Alma-Ata on 18 February 1992. The status of the basin water associations for Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya was established on 6 April 1992 in Ashgabat as an executive and interdepartmental control body of ICWC of Central Asia republics, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan in line with the Alma-Ata Agreement.

Agreement among the Central Asian Countries on Joint Activities in Addressing the Aral Sea and the Zone around the Sea Crisis, Improving the Environment, and Enduring the Social and Economic Development of the Aral Sea Region

The agreement was made among all states of Central Asia in Kyzyl-Orda on 26 March 1993. Despite the intention to save the Aral Sea among the Central Asian States, there was a specific role given to the Russian Federation for supporting the social and economic development of the Aral Sea. According to Article III,

⁵ Please refer to the following website for detailed information, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/09/19980925%2006-30%20PM/Ch_XXVII_12p.pdf

The Russian Federation would participate in the Interstate Council work as an observer in addressing the Aral Sea crisis and the rehabilitation of the zone.

AT BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL LEVEL

Agreement between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational Water and Energy Uses

Agreement on the distribution of water in return for compensation from Uzbekistan was reached between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on 4 February 1998, 13 April 1999, and 14 January 2000.

Agreement among Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr-Darya Basin

The agreement was made on the modalities of water allocation and in returns in Bishkek on 17 March 1998.

Agreement between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on Comprehensive Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Naryn

The agreement was made on 22 May 1999 regarding Syr-Darya Cascade Reservoirs to provide efficient water releases during the growing season, prevent flooding of areas in mid-and downstream Syr-Darya, and for the rational use of fuel and energy resources. A similar agreement was made also in Bishkek on 23 May 2000.

All these international conventions, agreements at the regional and national level clearly show that there is a disagreement among the Central Asia states. Although the respective conventions offer a peaceful solution and dialogue, the Central Asian states have not been able to develop solutions in favor of all states until today. The inclusion of the old hegemonic state of Russia in the water issue through agreement makes the matter more complicated. Recalling the ongoing negotiations for border demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border, both Central Asian states refer to the Russian Federation archives. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan locate the border arrangements made by the Soviet Union on different dates for reinforcing their claims. These regulations are mostly in favor of one but against the other.

CENTRAL ASIAN WATER BASINS: SYR-DARYA AND AMU-DARYA

Most of the water used in the region flows from the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya Rivers originating from the Pamir and Tian Shan mountains.

Map 1. *Syr-Darya-Amu-Darya Rivers Flow Routes*



Source: Ziganshina (2014)

As can be seen from the map, the Syr-Darya River flows through Kyrgyzstan and passes over Tajikistan (also through the densely populated Fergana Valley), and then flows towards Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Amu-Darya River also flows from Tajikistan towards Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

As marked on the map, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are located on the upper part of the Amu-Darya River and named Lake upstream states, while Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are located on the lower part of the Amu-Darya River and named downstream states. It should be noted that the Karakum canal, an artificial reservoir completed in 1967, which flows through the Karakum Desert and carries water from the Amu-Darya River, is one of the world’s largest irrigation and shipping canals. The downstream states use water mostly for agricultural purposes, whereas upstream states use water as hydro energy.

Table 1. *Water Basins in Central Asia*

States	Syr-Darya River	Amu-Darya River
Kyrgyzstan	74.2 %	2.0 %
Kazakhstan	6.5 %	-
Uzbekistan	16.6 %	8.5 %
Tajikistan	2.7 %	72.9 %
Turkmenistan	-	1.9 %
Afghanistan	-	13.9 %

Source: Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva (2013: 212)

According to the table, 74.2% of the Syr-Darya River water basin is in Kyrgyzstan territory, while 72.9% of the Amu-Darya River water basin is in Tajikistan. These states, upstream states, are significant actors in the allocation of water. Despite having such water basin, half of the people in rural areas from both states do not have access to drinking water and energy even today (Laruelle et al., 2013: 2).

Table 2. *Structure of Energy Sources in Central Asia.*

States	Hydro Energy	Gas	Oil	Coal
Tajikistan	96%	2%	1%	1%
Kyrgyzstan	82%	2%	5%	11%
Kazakhstan	1%	16%	50%	33%
Uzbekistan	1%	84%	13%	2%
Turkmenistan	0%	83%	17%	0%

Source: (Lemenkova, 2013).

Upstream states have far more capacity in terms of hydro energy compared to downstream states. Likewise, downstream states are richer than upstream states due to having coal, oil, and gas. The figures in Table 2 clearly express the interest for both upstream and downstream states to cooperate and protect the environment.

WATER REGULATIONS IN THE USSR PERIOD

To deeply examine water regulations, it is required to make a short journey in the history of the establishments of Central Asian states starting from Tsarist Russia. The demographic research carried out by Barthold, who was the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of the Borderlands of Russia and the director of the Central Asia department and served for the Academy between 1912 and 1930, made significant contributions to the transformation policies of the Soviet Union⁶. Being aware of the demographic structure in the Central Asian region was the determining factor in the planning of the administrative borders of the regional states during Central Asia states establishment, and later periods of the USSR (Green, 2000: 71).

The Central Asian people as the other states of the Soviet Union subjected to a program called the New Economic Model. With this model, also known as Kolkhoz, new educational, economic, social, cultural, political, and agricultural policies were introduced, particularly, in the Central Asia region. Private property rights were prohibited in line with the New Economic Model (Karabulut, 2019: 58). Lenin's May 1918 decree regarding "*The Organization of Irrigation Work in Turkestan*" emphasized the cotton production directly that led to work on large-scale irrigation projects in Central Asia to ensure the USSR's cotton independence (Micklin, 1991: 11).

Then, the New Economic Model was implemented by Lenin in 1921 and continued with periodic intervals. Following the implementation of the economic model, the USSR took third place in the world in the irrigated area, after China and India (Micklin, 1991: 8). Also, it ranked third in the world in cotton production after Egypt and the US with the supply of over 90% from Central Asia (Micklin, 1991: 10). Therefore, the cotton production in Central Asia meant earnings of foreign exchange for the USSR. Since cotton production was prioritized during

6 Known as the historian of Turkestan, Vasily V. Barthold was born in 1869 in St. Petersburg. He was a member of a wealthy family of German origin. He changed his name from Wilhelm to Vasily Vladimirovich. He served as a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences between 1912-1930. In other words, he continued the task he started in the Tsarist period until he died in the USSR period. Barthold worked in many European, Istanbul, and Cairo libraries. In 1917, he wrote the history of Kyrgyz and Turkmens. For more detailed information, please refer to "*Four studies on the History of Central Asia*" book.

the USSR, the regulations for the use of water also coordinated by the central government. Soviet planners made the crucial arrangement for the water basins of the Central Asian region in the 1950s.

The purpose of these arrangements was to promote large projects that greatly increase agricultural production and facilitate land reclamation. All plans and implementation managed directly from Moscow (Becks, 2011: 38). In this context, the Karakum Canal, an artificial reservoir that started to build in 1954, was a product of that period to irrigate the desert region surrounding the Sea to favor agriculture rather than supply the Aral Sea basin.

During the Soviet period, the Aral Sea Basin was managed as part of economic activities. Soviet central planners considered Central Asian rivers for irrigation of cotton, which generated greater economic conditions and let much of its water flow empty into the Aral Sea (Postel, 2000: 943). According to Soviet-era regulations, the upstream states would supply the necessary water in spring and summer for irrigation-based agricultural economies, and cotton fields of downstream states.

In return for the allocation of water, the downstream states would provide gas and coal to the upstream states during the winter. While water management was an internal issue in which Moscow covered all maintenance and operational costs of dams and reservoirs has become an interstate problem after the collapse of the USSR (Zakhirova, 2013: 1997).

WATER ARRANGEMENTS POST-SOVIET PERIOD

With the independence of the Central Asian States, the former integrated economic system dissolved. Each state of the Central Asian states reformulated its economic priorities (Sokolov, 2009). After the collapse of the USSR, the Central Asian states reached an agreement on February 18, 1992, for the distribution of water and in returns in line with the Almaty Agreement that consists of 15 articles. Before this agreement was signed, Uzbekistan put forward its objections about the water allocation rate agreed during the USSR period.

The method of *collaboration and combining the action required for collaboration* used for solving the water issue. According to the agreement, the Central Asian states maintained their water allocation rates in the USSR period. Also, the governments of the region promised to avoid projects that would harm each other and to keep communication channels open for information exchange (Horsman, 2004: 71).

Table 3. *Water Allocation as Stated in the Almaty Agreement*

State	Syr-Darya River Water Allocation (%)	Amu-Darya River Water Allocation (%)
Kazakhstan	38.1	0
Kyrgyzstan	1.0	0.4
Tajikistan	9.2	13.06
Turkmenistan	0	43.0
Uzbekistan	51.7	43.0

Source: Zakhirova (2013: 1997)

Even though the upstream states are the source of the water for downstream states, they received water in small quotas and provided large quotas allocations for the downstream states due to less cotton production reflected in the table (Zakhirova, 2013: 1998). According to the Almaty agreement, it decided to establish an interstate commission to regulate water arrangements in the region. The water allocation commission under the name of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC) operates as part of the International Fund, which protects the Aral Sea as well as ensures economic use of water throughout the region.

The operation purpose of the ICWC water allocation commission identified as *“to implement management solutions for the protection of the Aral Sea, to determine the rational use of water, to protect the cross-border water resources, and to implement jointly planned programs based on the interests of the parties, partnership, and mutual respect* (Kushkumbayev and Kushkumbayeva, 2013: 214). Despite the agreement among the sides, the Central Asian states do not support the work of the ICWC water allocation commission (Woldemariam, 2007: 12).

In other words, the upstream and downstream states are not fulfilling their commitments. As the tension is continuing with water allocation, the Central Asia region faces another challenge arising from the construction of Rogun Dam in Tajikistan and the Kambarata HPP1 dam in Kyrgyzstan. The dam construction causes new conflicts among the states of the Central Asian states and lets to apply various pre-emptive measures against each other.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROGUN HYDRO POWER PLANT

The construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Plant was first proposed at the beginning of 1959 for the period of the USSR to strengthen the agricultural economy⁷. Although the project was initiated as of 1976, the construction of the dam was put on hold without taking any further action until the collapse of the USSR. The dissolve of the USSR became a cornerstone to realize the construction of the Rogun HPP. The Rogun water reservoir area was approved under the Almaty agreement signed in 1992, which was formulating the Central Asian region water allocation and joint management of water. The construction of the Rogun Hydro Power Plant was first proposed at the beginning of 1959 to strengthen the agricultural economy.

The dissolution of the USSR became a cornerstone to realize the construction of the Rogun HPP. Although the agreement was made in 1992, the necessary works to retain the water in the Rogun region did not commence due to the Tajik civil war. After the civil war and stabilization of the public order, Tajikistan searched

⁷ The Rogun dam, which constructed on the Vakhsh River and located in the Pamir region, one of the main mountain areas of Central Asia called the roof of the world, has 335 meters of filling rock area. With the construction of the Rogun Dam, the energy production of Tajikistan doubled. As for the remained construction site, the agreement made between Salini Impregilo and the OJSC “Rogun Hydroelectric Project” (state company coordinating the project). The construction is composed of four parts related to the operation of Pamir’s huge hydroelectric potential. At the time the construction of the dam is completed, it will contain 6 turbines of 600 MW each, which means that the total installed power, the equivalent of three nuclear power plants, reaches 3,600 MW. The most significant outcome of the dam construction is to place Tajikistan a reference-point for the energy sector in the region, to increase the energy production, and to reduce power cuts in winter that the state frequently faces. For more information, please refer to the following website <https://www.salini-impregilo.com/en/projects/in-progress/rogun-dam.html#>.

for international financial support to build the Rogun Dam in the 2000s. Despite the three agreements made with the Russian Federation respectively in 1994, 2000 and 2004, the construction of the Rogun Dam was never completed (Rozanov, 2015).

The negotiations were conducted with the Russian Federation, and the construction of the Rogun Dam was resumed in 2008. Following that negotiations, one of the derivation-tunnels of the Vakhsh River was renovated in 2010 as part of the Rogun Dam construction, and this part became the highest water holding area in the region (Akhmetkaliyeva, 2016). Reiteratively, Tajikistan faced with the financial problems due to ongoing construction.

Even, in the period when the World Bank prepared the seismic assessment report, Tajikistan tried to reach an agreement with the Russian Federation for the financial support. Tajikistan extended the deadline of the 201st Motor Rifle Division of the Russian Federation in Tajikistan until 2042 in exchange for a symbolic amount in 2014 as for its support. There were rumors that Iran would utilize water from the Rogun Dam by pipeline. But none of the parties made any statements confirming this information. Despite the extension of the deadline of 201st Motor Rifle Division, the Russian Federation did not provide any financial support.

Immediately upon the construction of the Rogun HPP, Tajikistan faced conflicts directly with Uzbekistan, and indirectly with other downstream states. Particularly, Uzbekistan constantly opposed the construction of the dam. Uzbekistan claimed that in the case of keeping water in the dam, the agricultural areas would be affected. In addition to that, the dam might be destroyed by a possible earthquake. As a result, the consequences of dam construction would be devastating for the regional economy.

Essentially, Uzbekistan was concerned that Tajikistan could use the Rogun Dam as a pressure tool on the foreign policy between the two states (Kucera, 2013: 3). Against the allegations and suspicions of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan stated that if Uzbekistan could support the project, it would allow Uzbekistan to control the annual water release in the water basin (Akhmetkaliyeva, 2016).


In conjunction with the above-mentioned declaration, Tajikistan signaled a green light for cooperation with Uzbekistan. It also pointed out that the importance of the dam-building for Tajikistan's energy needs. Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon believes that the construction of the Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River is the solution to the countless energy problems. Since Tajikistan frequently exposed to power cuts in cold winter conditions, the electricity produced by the construction of the Rogun Dam would meet the domestic energy needs. In the event of having surplus electricity, the market for Afghanistan, Pakistan, or China market would be available. Uzbekistan responded to Tajikistan's open cooperation requests with sanctions. The water-based dispute did not resolve in the second quarter of 2011. On 16-17 November 2011, the bombing action that took place on the Uzbekistan side of the Ghalaba-Amuzang railway targeted the bridge, which provided transportation between the two states, and caused damage. The railway transportation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was interrupted.

All railway traffic between Termez (Uzbekistan) and Qurghan Tappa (Tajikistan)

was stopped after this incident. On 16 December 2011, the Ministry of Transport of Tajikistan delivered “Nota Verbal” to the OSCE’s Dushanbe office, requesting that the OSCE should take a role in this matter. In addition to that, Tajikistan offered to pay a fee for the repair of the bridge on the Uzbekistan side. The Uzbekistan side responded to this proposal negatively and stated its priority was to clarify the bombing action rather than building the bridge. The Uzbek side did not provide any information regarding the judicial investigation and operational time. Due to the inability to use the railway between the two states, also, road transportation over Uzbekistan to Tajikistan faced serious obstacles. Although there were no technical, security, and personnel shortages on the Uzbekistan side, border crossings were at the lowest level starting from November 2011 till the end of February 2012.

After the interruption of the train transportation between the two states, the Tajik State Railways Company claimed that Uzbekistan increased train transportation fees by 32% in January 2012, which was an extra cost of \$70 million per year for Tajik importers. Ultimately, the World Bank intervened in the conflict between the two countries in 2012. The World Bank organized (5) meetings in which the Central Asian states were the main participants for the Assessment Studies of the Rogun Hydroelectric Project (Akhmetkaliyeva, 2016).

Map 2. *Fault Lines on Rogun Dam Track Area*



Source: Bellier (2013: 8)

According to the seismic assessment report prepared for the World Bank, there are (3) fault lines in Tajikistan. The place where the Rogun Hydro Power Plant built located between the fault lines of Ionakhsh and Gulizindan (Bellier, 2013: 9). The parameter values regarding the venue of the dam were within the acceptable limits per the conducted studies. The information was shared with the participants in the above-mentioned consultation meeting accordingly (News Central Asia, 2018). The breaking point was the death of the former president of Uzbekistan on September 2, 2016.


President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who came to power after Islam Karimov, removed Uzbekistan’s reserves on the Rogun Dam construction in 2016.

Tajikistan continued the building of the dam in 2016 by signing a contract with the firm Salini Impregilo. The Italian company commenced the work in October of the same year. The dam construction project included dozens of subcontractors from China, Germany, Iran, and the Russian Federation (Najibullah, 2018). The problem of financing the Rogun Dam was solved through the sale of government bonds. Tajikistan government bonds were sold at 85% to fund managers, 9% to hedge funds, 6% to banks and other financial institutions in conjunction with the investor type. The bonds bought by investors from the USA with the amount of 38%, the UK with the amount of 24%, EU countries with the amount of 24%, and finally by Asia investors with the amount of 3% (Aliyeva, 2018). Phase 1 of the Rogun Dam, which has been continuing for approximately 42 years and has been interrupted several times, started to function on 16 November 2018 (Stratfor, 2018).

THE CONSTRUCTION OF KAMBARATA HYDRO POWER PLANT

Kyrgyzstan's physical geography looks like Tajikistan's geography and it is a mountainous region and has rivers. It is considered as one of the upstream states. Although it is rich in water resources, it is extremely poor in terms of having hydrocarbon resources. Kyrgyzstan currently has the Kambarata-2 Hydro Power Plants, also known as Kambar-Ata-2 located on the Naryn River in Kambar. The preliminary work regarding the construction of the Kambarata HPP-1 dam has been continuing since the 1970s.

Map 3. Planned KHPP Site



Source: Havenith et al. (2015: 4)

It has planned to be built 14 km over the Kambarata HPP-2 on the Naryn River in the V-shaped canyon as seen on the map. Although the Kambarata HPP 1 planned to be built on the upper side of Naryn Waterfall on the Naryn River, its design phase continued until the 1980s. The collapse of the USSR stopped construction works due to a lack of funding that commenced in 1986. Kyrgyzstan tried to make negotiations with Kazakhstan and Russian Federation to resume its construction in 2009. Though Russia promises to pledge \$1.7 billion as debt for the construction of Kambarata Dam, it withdrew the credit back owing to the Manas case. After a while, Russia agreed to invest in the

construction again in 2012. But it did not fund the construction of the dam despite the groundwork completed and feasibility work carried out by SNC Lavalin International Company approved by the Kyrgyz government in July 2014. The Kyrgyz government canceled the agreement with Russia on the construction and operation of the Kambarata HPP 1 (Menga, 2018: 14).

Table 4. *Kambarata Hydro Power Plant-1*

Kam- barata HPP-1	Normal Re- source Level NHL, m	Installed Capacity MW	Electric Ener- gy Production, Mln. kWh	Reservoir Space Mln. Cbm	HPP Type
	1198	1860	5640	2730	Dam

Source: National Energy Holding Company (2019: 6)

If the Kambarata HPP plant becomes operational, its capacity will reach up to 1860 MW, as can be seen from the table, and it will supply the energy needs of Kyrgyzstan to a large extent. The construction processes of the Kambarata HPP 1 and the financing negotiations with the Russian Federation were remarkably like the Tajikistan Rogun HPP construction processes and financing negotiations. During the Kambarata HPP 1 construction process, Uzbekistan voiced its claims against the project. The Uzbek side stated that the construction of the dam would damage the Uzbek agricultural lands and destroy the Uzbek settlements due to the dam-building site location on the earthquake fault line. Also, receiving water for the Kambarata-1 HPP dam and discharging excess water in the winter considered as another problem (Rozanov, 2015).

The developing relations with the USA or China-led Russia to withdraw its financial support in 2016 despite its commitment. These efforts of the Kyrgyz government is taken into consideration as a conflict with the interests of the Russian Federation in the region. Although the Russian Federation and China are under the umbrella of the SCO organization, there is often a conflict of interest in the region between the two states. Due to funding problems, Kyrgyzstan President Atambayev stated that Kyrgyzstan would end its cooperation with the Russian Federation in the construction of the Kambarata-1 and search for new investors due to the difficulties of the Russian economy face. Also, Atambayev added that there was a mutual understanding with the Russian leadership in the search for new financing for the dam construction (Izvestia News, 2016).

The relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan developed after Mirziyoyev came to power in late 2017. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan governments agreed to cooperate in the construction of the Kambarata HPP 1. Following that, a working group was established to discuss technical issues. Unfortunately, this close relations did not turn into financial support. Kyrgyzstan's government continued its search for financing for the realization of the project. Within this framework, the Kyrgyz government made a presentation for possible investors in Istanbul in January 2019 and invited the investors to participate in the dam construction project. Today, the efforts between the Kyrgyzstan government and the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank for funding the Kambarata HPP-1 project is continuing.

CONCLUSION

The problems, which emerge from the water regulations in the Central Asian region, is mostly based on the policies of the Moscow administration. It was started to implement from the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and continued with the Russian Federation. Especially, the studies of the Central Asian Department of the USSR and the New Economic Model introduced by Lenin to increase cotton production led to the Aral Sea facing environmental hazards. The water resources distribution was designed in line with the benefits of the central government of the Soviet Union, contrary to the region's people.

Today, the projects, which put forward by the Central Asian states for economic development, are either not financially supported or postponed by the two most important players of the region, namely, Russia and China. Even though the Russian Federation agreed to provide financial support, as in the case of the Rogun and Kambarata dams, it withdrew financial support or stalled the demands of the relevant states, depending on its policies.

For example, the Russian Federation promised financial support to Tajikistan during the construction of the Rogun Dams. The deal was an extension of the 201st Motor Rifle Division in favor of the Russian Federation, while the Russian Federation would fund the construction in return. Tajikistan extended the deadline of the military base against a very symbolic fee until 2042. However, it did not get any financial support. The Tajikistan state bonds were purchased mostly by the Western States. The US was the first ranked due to buying 86% of the state bonds. That is why Tajikistan would be able to construct Rogun Dam. A similar situation regarding support of the Russian Federation revealed during the construction of the Kambarata HPP 1.

The Russian Federation limits the relationship of the Central Asian states with the other major and regional powers. It keeps them under control through regional organizations through CSTO or SCO. It maintains the same practice and limitations in the economic field of the Central Asian states. It neither allows other powers to intervene in the region nor allows the region states to have independent policies. The constructive approach of Uzbekistan reinforced the stability in the region and provided conditions for peaceful solutions.

The water usage in Central Asia should identify in a friendly manner and issues solve among the Central Asian states without intervening and including any great powers. However, any support for economic development should welcome from out of the Central Asian region within the framework of the water issue. The areas of action and economic motivations determined for Central Asia during the Soviet Union period have changed. The states of the region should not be in a position of negligence in making more independent decisions. The economic situation, irrigation, and agricultural areas in the region should overhaul again.

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**BROKEN DREAMS IN ASHKHABAD:
AN OVERVIEW OF TURKMENISTAN'S POST-INDEPENDENCE
POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF
CENTRAL ASIAN MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA**

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ABSTRACT

This article presents a discussion on political contradictions of post-independence Turkmenistan. As part of a broader effort to understand the social and power dynamics resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union, we apply a descriptive analysis of the principal domestic and foreign policy events involving the Ashkhabad government, as well as the implications for the lives of Turkmen migrants in Russia, who have chosen to leave their country of origin in search of better opportunities. The current paper suggests that Turkmenistan not only became a laboratory for the exercise of a local version of a 'Cult of Personality' of the leader, but also precariously operationalized its political neutrality due to economic dependence on Moscow and, more recently, on China. Regarding Turkmen migrants abroad, we evidence their difficulties of assimilation in Russia, due, in part, to a 'stereotyped' view about migrants on the part of Russian population.

Keywords: Turkmenistan, Central Asia, Authoritarianism, Post-Soviet Space, Russian Public Opinion.

INDRODUCTION

Turkmenistan, a Central Asian country within the Post-Soviet space which is home to some 5.8 million people, has successfully managed to cut off almost any contact with the outside world and this situation is not expected to change any time soon. None of the Western-designed social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram), messaging apps (Whatsapp, Messenger, Skype), applications (Youtube) or even search engines (such as Google) are allowed to work freely within the country. Russian versions of those same Western-designed social networks and apps (e.g. Vkontakte, Telegram, Yandex etc.) also do not fare much differently. Calling someone within Turkmenistan can be described as a *'tour de force'*, as telecommunications around the country are intentionally undeveloped and whenever someone manages (very rarely) to get a call through, there is always the risk of being cut off abruptly due to connection issues or due to the country's always vigilant surveillance regime. Young people and women trying to fly from Ashkhabad to other countries can be stopped at the airport for no apparent reason and being simply denied to fly, unless a couple hundred dollars can be spent to bribe airport officials.

The stories above, albeit bearing resemblance to situations one would attribute immediately to North Korea, in fact occur at a daily basis within one of the most closed, and yet one of the least studied countries in the IR field, Turkmenistan. With the aim to fill this *lacunae* in knowledge concerning Turkmenistan, in particular, and to contribute to the studies of post-Soviet Central Asia, in general, this article sets out to present a discussion of Ashkhabad's post-independence political contradictions. To that end, the article is divided in three distinct sections: the first one deals with Turkmenistan's peculiar dictatorship and personality cult surrounding both presidents Niyazov (1992-2006) and Berdymukhamedov (2007-currently). The second section approaches Ashkhabad's dependence from Moscow and, more recently, China in view of its exploration of natural resources, especially gas. Finally, the third and last part will tackle Turkmen (and Central Asian) migrants' perils relating to their adaptation and acceptance within the Russian Federation.

In terms of methodology, the first section of our paper will rely mostly on a descriptive analysis of the main domestic political events of Post-Soviet Turkmenistan. The second section will bring data from the bilateral trade and the economic relationship between Turkmenistan with both China and Russia, whereas the third and last section will focus on general stereotypes held by the Russian population about Central Asian migrants obtained by public opinion surveys, as well as by interviews conducted by the author.

TURKMENISTAN'S PECULIAR DICTATORSHIP: DOMESTIC CONTRADICTIONS AND PERSONALITY CULT

Post-Independence: Niyazov's 'Cult of Personality'

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan continued to be ruled by President Saparmurat Niyazov, who was appointed the First Secretary of the Communist Party branch of the country back in 1985. Running unopposed for president in 1990 and 1992, Niyazov, as the only candidate available, won the electoral dispute in those years with 98.3 and 99.5 percent of the votes

respectively (OSCE, 2007). In 1993, Turkmenistan's Parliament (the Mejlis) cancelled the presidential election marked for 1997, extending the President's term up until 2002, a measure further approved by public referendum in 1994 by 99.99 percent of the voters. By the end of 1999, the government then decided to make Niyazov President-for-life in Turkmenistan, in a clear contradiction to the country's Constitution.

During his presidency, Niyazov adopted the epithet of *Türkmenbaşy* (Turkmenbashi), or "Father of All Turkmen", having taken further steps into the creation of an indigenous version of a 'Cult of Personality'. Including other extravagant endeavors, Niyazov built a 14 meter-high golden statue of himself in the capital Ashkhabad (with an estimated cost of around 12 million US\$), alongside various monuments and busts in his homage². The image of the president was printed on paper money, posters, on different government buildings, in mosques, on front page of newspapers. Additionally, Niyazov also renamed the months of the year in his honor with January for instance being changed to Turkmenbashi (*Türkmenbaşy*).

In 2001 a moral/religious guide written by Niyazov named *Ruhnama* (or Book of the Soul in Turkmen), became a compulsory reading in high schools and universities (Burke, 2014), turning into a local analogue of the Quran itself. Not long after the book's release, the knowledge of *Ruhnama* was also mandatory for professional certification in all institutions and organizations of Turkmenistan (Ria Novosti, 2006)³. Niyazov's presidency was indeed marked by numerous polemics and political setbacks for Turkmenistan. As an example, after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Niyazov in 2002, Turkmenistan witnessed an increasingly level of mass repressions and imprisonment.

Figure 1. *Golden Statue of Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) in Ashkhabad (Niyazov's 'Cult of Personality' takes physical form)*



Source: Radio Free Europe

Benefitting from the lack of serious external threats to the State, the Turkmen government shifted "primary responsibility for national security to domestic

² During his presidency, Niyazov also used the State's wealth from gas exports in order to implement luxurious architectural projects. Among them, he built Central Asia's largest mosque, named Spirit of Turkmenbashi, with an estimated cost of more than £60 million.

³ Notwithstanding, to promote the president's guide, all other literary works were suppressed in the country

security services [...] focused on combating internal dissent” (Gorenburg, 2014: 13). Also as a result of the failed attempt at his life, an earlier agreement with Russia on the possibility of Turkmen citizens to receive double citizenship (signed between Niyazov himself and [Russian President] Boris Yeltsin in 1993) was repealed unilaterally by Nyazov.

Citizens were then forcibly required to choose either the Russian or the Turkmen citizenship, but not the double citizenship which was previously available to them. In effect, Turkmenistan’s Russian-speaking population “perceived double citizenship as the only guarantee from the arbitrariness of the Turkmen authorities” (Kazantsev, 2016), meaning that they could, in view of the circumstances in their home country, try to make a life (in the quality of citizens) for themselves in Russia and still be able to preserve their rights in Turkmenistan.

Beyond those restrictive measures, in 2005 Niyazov ordered the closure of all hospitals in the country - with the exception of those located in Ashkhabad - on the grounds that people who got sick could travel to the capital for treatment⁴; not long afterwards, Niyazov also closed local libraries in the villages, once, according to the president, villagers still ‘don’t read’ (Lenta.ru, 2005)⁵. Turkmenistan’s Academy of Sciences (one of the most prestigious academic institutions of the country) was shut off as well and in the universities, the study period was limited to 2 years. All these aforementioned initiatives were undertaken within an environment of no-criticism towards the President, be it by domestic political opposition or media, as it was tightly controlled by the State⁶.

From *Turkmenbasi* to *Arkadag*: or How to Replace One Dictatorship with Another

Niyazov died of a sudden heart attack at the end of 2006. According to the Constitution of Turkmenistan, in the event of a President’s death, new elections were to be held for the next Head of State, while his powers should be transferred to the Chairperson of the Mejlis (the country’s parliament). However, the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Council (NSC) of Turkmenistan, ignoring the Constitution, appointed Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, instead, then the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers, to occupy temporarily the post of Head of the State⁷. Then, in 2007 Turkmenistan held its multi-candidate presidential election (with all contenders belonging to the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan) in order to ‘legitimize’ the rule of Berdymukhamedov. As reported by OSCE (2007: 2) in the elections “no individuals who identify themselves as political opposition, and mostly reside outside Turkmenistan, were nominated

4 In 2005 alone, Niyazov fired 15,000 medical workers, while provincial hospitals ran short of doctors and medicaments (Lenta.ru, 2005)

5 During Niyazov’s period as Head of State in Turkmenistan ballet, opera, circus, and theater were too forbidden

6 Civil society in Turkmenistan being ill-developed (both administrative and organizationally) could do little to override or meddle with the government’s plans. Niyazov, nevertheless, implemented a few socially-oriented internal policies, providing Turkmenistan’s population with basically free gas, water supply and electricity (Paramonov and Stokov 2008). Those measures could thus be directed to appease popular dissent towards contradictory political measures undertaken by Turkmen authorities. Nevertheless, in 2017, due to an economic crisis (provoked by falling prices of oil and gas in international markets), the presidential administration had to cancel the gratuity of gas, water supply and electricity for the Turkmen.

7 The actual Chairperson of the Mejlis, Ovezgeldy Ataev, was barred from assuming the position of Head of State after Turkmenistan’s Prosecutor’s Office filed a criminal case against him (OSCE 2007). In fact, according to analysts, the Turkmen Constitution should be considered as merely a declarative document (Kazantsev, quoted in Независимая Газета 2016)

as candidate”. In that election, the acting President Berdymukhamedov won 89% of the votes.

After taking office, much akin Nikita Khrushchev’s campaign of de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union, Berdymukhamedov got rid of some elements of his predecessor’s ‘Cult of Personality’ in Turkmenistan. He cancelled the mandatory reading of *Ruhnama*, brought back the old traditional calendar, reopened Turkmenistan’s Academy of Sciences and restored full secondary education (up to 5 years), opera, ballet and circus (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2016)⁸.

Notwithstanding, it didn’t take long for Berdymukhamedov to replace one cult of personality with another. The new President for instance also adopted an epithet for himself, in this case *Arkadag*, meaning “Protector”, whereas new golden monuments were opened in the capital city of Ashkhabad in his homage, while Niyazov’s ones were transferred to the city’s outskirts. Within this new context, in 2012, Berdymukhamedov obtained 97% of the votes and in 2017 (the last elections held in Turkmenistan so far) 97%. In fact, elections in Turkmenistan during Berdymukhamedov’s presidency were also marked by the impediment of real oppositional political forces. Additionally, in 2016, prior to the last election, the Mejlis abolished the age limit for the presidency, in practice allowing Berdymukhamedov to become *de facto* Head of State for life (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2016).

Meanwhile, political freedoms in Turkmenistan were continuously repressed during *Arkadag*’s presidency. As a result, a movement founded in 2013 and headed by international organizations dedicated to the defense of human rights released a campaign directed towards Ashkhabad known as ‘Show Them Alive’⁹, with a list of more than 100 political prisoners currently held by the State, whose destinies remain unknown to their families. According to a recently released document by the organization, “the practice of enforced disappearances in Turkmenistan [...] has been systematic [...] in midst of severe suppression of civil liberties and lack of access to the country for foreign human rights organizations and international observers” (Pokazhite Ikh Zhivymi! 2019: 1)¹⁰. Meanwhile, the deaths of a significant number of people in custody were met with the authorities’ indifference, which, by its turn, neglected their investigation, turning them into ‘extrajudicial executions’ by the State (*ibidem*).

Notwithstanding the overall restrictive political environment, Turkmenistan also faced the rise of drug addiction and trafficking in the country during Berdymukhamedov’s tenure in power. There is indeed suspicion that Turkmenistan’s border guards and personnel are themselves involved in cross-border smuggling operations, due to inherent corruption and political patronage (Gorenburg, 2014) by State’s authorities. Addiction to drugs, according to non-governmental sources, is widespread especially among young people, due to the lack of educational as well as professional and economic opportunities, coupled with significant unemployment rates and the low price of narcotics (Berdyeva, 2010)¹¹.

8 Berdymukhamedov also reinstated provincial hospitals closed under Niyazov.

9 In Russian Cyrillic Покажите их живыми!

10 Практика насильственных исчезновений в Туркменистане на протяжении последних 17 лет носит систематический характер [...] в условиях жесткого подавления гражданских свобод и отсутствия доступа в страну для зарубежных правозащитных организаций и международных наблюдателей (original in Russian).

11 Nevertheless, Ashkhabad refused to join a regional anti-drug coalition led by Moscow in 2010 (alongside Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan), on the grounds that there are no problems related to drug addiction in the country (Berdyeva, 2010).

All this turmoil, meanwhile, occurred in a country with rich natural resources, especially oil and gas, but whose government's policies, instead of directing Turkmenistan's export revenues towards tackling acute domestic problems, preferred to use the State's budget for projects of personal aggrandizement of its leaders.

TURKMENISTAN'S [IN]DEPENDENCE DILEMMA: ASHKHABAD'S PIVOT FROM RUSSIA TO CHINA

December 12th marked 25 years since Turkmenistan declared its 'political neutrality', being one of the few countries around the globe that upholds such a position and recognized internationally by the United Nations. Notwithstanding, Ashkhabad's political neutrality did not necessarily translate into economic 'independence' of the country, especially in relation to Russia and, more recently, China. In effect, Turkmenistan is famous by possessing the fourth-largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world¹², turning it into a 'gas power' in Central Asia, with its economy relying heavily on the export of *commodities* to the international market. On average, from 1997 to 2018, natural gas composed approximately 74.3% of the country's total exports, seconded by refined petroleum with 10.9% (Observatory of Economic Complexity, n/d).

However, albeit rich in natural gas and oil, Turkmenistan suffers from lack of infrastructure to better exploit its resources, thus depending on external sources for investment in this sector. Up to this point for instance, Ashkhabad "has virtually no international oil pipeline infrastructure" (US Energy Information Administration, 2016) with Gazprom (the biggest Russian exporter and producer of natural gas) holding a monopolistic control over the transit and distribution of Turkmen gas to Europe. In effect, a component of Russia's political influence in Central Asia¹³ regards the Turkmenistan's dependency on the economic infrastructures controlled by Moscow, especially in the transportation of natural gas and oil through Russian territory to European markets (Freire, 2008), a situation explained by the region's "decades-long membership in the former Soviet economic system" (Weitz, 2014: 37)

In 1996 for instance, then head of Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev, was quoted as saying Gazprom would "not allow gas to be exported from Turkmenistan by routes other than through Russia" (Paramonov and Stokov, 2008: 20), thus putting Ashkhabad in a situation of dependence on Moscow's economic grip. Meanwhile, as Kotkin (2002: 29) suggests, "Russia [...] prefers to reap [Central Asia's] regional resources without [...] being burdened with responsibility for local government and social welfare", which helps explain Moscow's passive instance in face of the misdeeds and arbitrariness of the Turkmenistan's government (discussed in the previous section) for example.

In 2003, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and Niyazov signed a long-term contract between the two countries for the sale and purchase of Turkmen natural

12 As of 2019, Turkmenistan holds 9.8% of the total global reserves of natural gas, behind only Qatar (12.4%), Iran (16.1%) and Russia (19.1%) (BP, 2020).

13 Central Asia is composed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while also including parts of the territories of six other countries: Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. Historically the region is part of what can be considered a Russian zone of influence, having remained for centuries under direct control by Moscow, since the mid-19th. During the USSR period, Central Asian States' borders were designed by the Soviet government, according to ethnic-national lines, mostly on the same lines of today's regional frontiers.

gas for 25 years (Gazprom.ru, 2003). At the time, Gazprom's head Alexey Miller (2003) lauded the agreement as a "huge breakthrough in relations between Russia and Turkmenistan in the gas sector"¹⁴ solidifying the cooperation between two 'leading gas powers'¹⁵. Within the agreement, Ashkhabad guaranteed the supply of natural gas to Russia, while Moscow accounted for its transportation to the end consumers¹⁶. By that time, gas production in Turkmenistan accounted for 60 billion m³ per year, while domestic consumption revolved around 10-12 billion m³, with the exceeding gas being exported mainly to Ukraine, with Gazprom working as the transit guarantor of Turkmen gas (through the territories of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia) via the Central Asia-Center pipeline (CAC)¹⁷.

Table 1. Where does Turkmenistan export to? (1997-2010)

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Ukraine (70%)	Italy (22.3% ¹⁸)	Ukraine (32.2%)	Russia (33.5%)	Ukraine (70.6%)	Ukraine (70.7%)	Ukraine (64.6%)
2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ukraine (54.6%)	Ukraine (54.9%)	Ukraine (63.2%)	Ukraine (71.9%)	Ukraine (70%)	Ukraine (34.3%)	China (38.8%)

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity

Within this contract, between 2004 and 2006 50% of the Russian payments for Turkmen gas came in the form of equipment supplies to Ashkhabad for further development of its gas industry, in view of Turkmenistan's dire conditions in terms of infrastructure. Moreover, the prices for Turkmen gas initially set in 44 US\$ for 1 thousand m³ in 2004 were raised to 150 US\$ in the second half of 2008, providing higher revenues for the Turkmenistan government, albeit not directed to the wellbeing of its population.

Nevertheless, from 2009 onwards the [once profitable] economic relationship between Turkmenistan and Russia started to change. In April 2009 supplies of Turkmen gas to Russia were interrupted due to an accident (which some observers believed to be caused by Gazprom as a retaliatory measure against Ashkhabad' dispute over gas prices) on the main pipeline connecting Russia and Central Asia. A new agreement between Gazprom and Turkmenistan was afterwards signed by the end of 2009, according to which Russia planned to import 10-11 billion m³ of gas from Turkmenistan, way less than the amount provided by Ashkhabad just one year prior¹⁹.

In face of the situation, from 2010 onwards, however, Turkmenistan started to redirect itself towards China in order to diversify its exports, after the conclusion in 2009 of a gas pipeline connecting the country to the Chinese market via

14 The documents signed today are a huge breakthrough in the relations between Russia and Turkmenistan in the gas sector [...] They define the future cooperation of the two leading gas powers for a quarter of a century (original in Russian) (Gazprom.ru, 2003).

15 In this context of cooperation between 'gas powers', Russia has for instance been a co-author of two emblematic Turkmenistan-initiated UN General Assembly resolutions. One concerning "Reliable and stable transit of energy and its role in ensuring sustainable development and international cooperation" and another one on "the role of transport and transit corridors in ensuring international cooperation for sustainable development".

16 According to the contract, Russia's purchase of Turkmen would leap from 5-6 billion cubic meters in 2004 to 70-80 billion cubic meters in 2009 (Gazprom.ru, 2003).

17 The Central Asia - Center gas pipeline system was built between 1967 and 1985 during the Soviet era.

18 In that year, 86.7% of Turkmenistan's exports to Italy were composed by refined petroleum.


19 Whose amount surpassed 60 billion m³.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the Central Asia-China Pipeline (CACP).

As Russia did not want and in practice was not able to develop full economic relations with the countries of Central Asia, the States in the region began to try and achieve economic relations with other countries, mainly countries outside the former Soviet space. Precisely because of Russia's inconsistencies, as seen in its periodic attempts to dictate conditions for the export of hydrocarbon fuels and its low regard for the interests of the Central Asian countries themselves, Turkmenistan [...] [was] pushed to take decisive action to diversify the export routes for [...] [its] energy resources (Paramonov and Stokov, 2008: 10)

Within this context, it is important to note that the Turkmenistan-China pipeline was entirely financed by China. In fact, as stated by Starr (2014: 161), in Central Asia in general Beijing's "economic outreach [...] has been so effective as to pose the prospect of substituting Russian economic domination [...] with massive interventions by China". Resulting from this close economic relation, in 2013, China and Turkmenistan established a strategic partnership, with Ashkhabad politically supporting Chinese positions on issues related to Taiwan²⁰, while adhering to the 'one-China policy'.

Figure 2. *Presidents Xi Jinping (China) and Berdymukhamedov (Turkmenistan)*



Source: Xinhuanet, 2013

Turkmenistan's approximation with China thus effectively represented a pivotal moment for the country, shifting its [long-term] dependence from Moscow to Beijing. As a result, while between 1997 and 2009, Ukraine was the destination of 84.5% of all Turkmen gas (through Russian soil), between 2010 and 2018 China accounted for 96.6% (Observatory Of Economic Complexity, n/d). In terms of overall exports, China then represented an average of 76.5% of all Turkmen's exports between 2011 and 2018.

²⁰ Opposing for instance Taiwan's accession to any international organization as a sovereign State, an issue of uttermost importance to Beijing.

Table 2. *Where does Turkmenistan export to? (2011-2018)*

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China (62.6%)	China (80.7%)	China (77.2%)	China (79.7%)	China (77.5%)	China (70.6%)	China (83.5%)	China (80.2%)

Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity

In 2019, Turkmen gas accounted alone for 2/3 of China’s total imports of gas (BP 2020). Meanwhile, although this ‘gas partnership’ with Beijing represented a successful shift by the Turkmen’s authorities in terms of its previous dependence from Moscow, it nevertheless evidenced the country’s economic fragilities and the precariousness of Ashkhabad’s ‘political neutrality’, once Turkmenistan is still in a position of dependency, this time with a different Eurasian power, and lacking the wherewithal to overcome its domestic problems even considering the country’s stable revenues from the exports of natural resources. It is indeed due to this situation that most Turkmen people opted for leaving the country in search of better opportunities abroad, especially in Russia, which is the topic of discussion of the third section of this paper.

TURKMEN [AND CENTRAL ASIAN] MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA: A CLASH OF ‘IDENTITIES’ AND ‘STEREOTYPES’ FROM THE PUBLIC OPINION

As of 2017, the Russian Federation accounted for the overwhelming majority of Turkmens living abroad, about 72%. In this context, the number of Turkmen students in Russia also grows every year²¹. Indeed, with the end of the USSR and the lack of economic perspectives left over within the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Russia became the most attractive destination for both economic and educational migration in the case of Turkmenistan.

Table 3. Data on Turkmen Population Abroad (selected years)

COUNTRIES	1990	2000	2017
Russia	140,551	175,252	185,795
Uzbekistan	52,226	42,565	7,100
Kazakhstan	42,141	33,227	2,493
Ukraine	32,406	24,926	23,824

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data

Nevertheless, in Russia opinion polls reveal a certain sense of indisposition of the local population towards Central Asian migrants in general. In 2017, when asked about their attitude in relation to migrants from the republics of Central Asia, only 10% of Russians said they “sympathized with them”, whereas 48% replied with “neutrality/tolerance” and 38% mentioned having a “negative” attitude towards migrants (Levada, 2017: 170). When asked, on the other hand, what constituted - in their opinion - the inherent traits of [Central Asian] migrants, the most referenced characteristics were as follows

²¹ At the beginning of the 2019/2020 academic year for instance, it consisted of about 36 thousand people

Table 4. Russians’ View on the Most Inherent Characteristics of Migrants from Central Asia (Number of Times a Given Characteristic Was Chosen per Each 100 Respondents)

2013	2016	2017
Lack of knowledge of the Russian language (53)	Lack of knowledge of the Russian language (39)	Lack of knowledge of the Russian language (36)
Low level of qualification in work they do (42)	Low level of qualification in work they do (32)	Low level of qualification in work they do (30)
Untidy, repulsive appearance (35)	Untidy, repulsive appearance (27)	High capacity of work, even receiving low salaries (25)

Source. Levada, 2017: 170

As shown in the table above, one of the most persistent views of Russian people towards Central Asian migrants concerns their perceived lack of control of the Russian language, as well as references to a low level of work qualification and even ‘repulsive appearance’. When asked “in your opinion, which of the following traits are inherent in migrant workers?” Russian respondents also highlighted a perception of migrants as ‘poorly educated people, capable only of common labor’ (32 out of 100 respondents), that they ‘are unhappy [...] [and having] to endure many difficulties and hardships’ (28 out of 100) and their ‘hard-work’ (26 out of 100) (Levada, 2017: 170).

Representative of this overall view, a popular comedic show in the Russian television - aired between 2006 and 2011 - known as наша Russia (Nasha Russia), had one of its sketches depicting a pair of Central Asian migrant workers from Tajikistan, Ravshan and Shumshud (Равшан и Шумшуд), incapable of understanding the most basic orientations from their Russian boss, while committing a multitude of mistakes in varied construction projects. The national appeal of such a television show, especially known among young people, ultimately reinforced the stereotype of migrant workers as lacking both language and professional skills.

Although, however, the problem of ‘prejudice’ is rarely discussed in the Russian public sphere, it nevertheless provides a ‘permissive’ environment for differentiated treatment – mostly discriminatory - towards nationalities from Central Asia in many workplaces, a situation especially acute not only in vibrant economic capitals such as Saint Petersburg and Moscow, but also in the country’s provincial and less metropolitan areas. As an example, episodes in 2017 and 2018 regarding Turkmen women working as caregiver assistants in kindergartens for Russian children in the city of Pskov (in Northwestern Russia) reportedly involved cases of persecution related to ethnic as well as religious differences (interviews conducted by the author)²². Those events demonstrate a somewhat uneasy coexistence of worldviews in Russia, where a tacit ‘clash’ of identities routinely takes place between adherents of Orthodoxy and atheists, on the one hand, and Muslims, on the other.

In fact, with the end of the USSR in 1991, the ideological vacuum left by

²² Additionally, it was also reported a differentiation in salary between Turkmen and Russian workers exercising the same function in these provincial kindergartens. Whereas the former usually received 10.000 P monthly as caregiver assistants (interviews conducted by the author), the average income for the Pskov region in 2018 consisted of 26.000 P.

Communism provided the conditions for an Orthodox religious revitalization in Russia, with the former 'partially' occupying the place of State ideology (Huntington, 1996). According to survey data seemingly 70% of the current Russian population considers itself Orthodox, 12% are atheists and 6% are Muslims (Segrillo, 2015)²³, thus placing Central Asians, in general, and Turkmen migrants, in particular, in the religious minority group. This reaffirmation of the Orthodox identity of Russia, albeit debatable in degree, is an element of contention with other sets of 'identities' within the Federation, such as the Muslims.

Figure 3. Aerial Photo of the Muslim Gathering at the Holyday Eid Al-Adha in St. Petersburg (Russia)



Source: Reuters.com

Additionally, in 2017 54% of Russians viewed migrants as 'a burden for our country because they take away workplaces from us' (Levada, 2017: 172), while 44% of respondents believed that migrants 'increase the possibility of terrorist attacks in our country' (*ibidem*). In 2017, for instance, a terrorist attack in a metro in Saint Petersburg was carried out by a young Russian citizen - Akbarzhon Jalilov - born in Kyrgyzstan, another former Soviet Central Asian republic of Muslim majority. Although the connection between the perpetrator and Islamic extremist groups had not been confirmed by Russian authorities, the incident led to the implementation of harsher security measures inside Metro stations both in Saint Petersburg and Moscow and to more frequent inquiries by Russian police officers towards Central Asian migrants in public spaces.

All the aforementioned provides an indicator into why Putin has always been careful when talking about terrorism in Russia, while attempting to dissociate it from Islam, a connection which is nevertheless often made by European and American leaders (Iandoli, 2017)²⁴. Therefore, Putin usually avoids using the term 'Islamic terrorism', since it could potentially alienate millions of Russian residents (Kramer, 2017)²⁵ of Islamic confession, including migrants. Be it as it

23 Moreover, post-2000 Russia witnessed an approximation between [its President Vladimir] Putin and the Orthodox Church, a consequential political movement that not only worked as a legitimizing factor for the Head of State, but that also resonated with a significant part of the Russian society (Bezerra 2019).

24 This cautious attitude by the Russian president would take into account the sizable Islamic community in Russia, which encompassed around 10% of the total population in 2016 (Iandoli 2017).

25 It does not, however, prevent Central Asians (or people with Arabic, Middle-Eastern and/or non-Slavic and

may, one recent observable trend in the public opinion is the growing number of Russians who favor the restriction of immigration into the country since mid-2000s (see Table 5 below)

Table 5. *What Should the Russian Government Policy towards Migrants Be Like?*

(N^a of respondents = 1600)

	2002	2007	2012	2017
Should try to restrict the influx of migrants	45%	57%	78%	71%
Should not have any administrative barriers against the influx, should try to use it for the benefit of Russia	44%	32%	14%	20%
Difficult to answer	11%	11%	8%	9%

Source: Levada, 2017

As shown in the table above, there was an increase from a little less than half (in 2002) to more than two thirds (in 2017) of the Russian respondents favoring the limitation and restrictions of the influx of migrants. This overall position, coupled with a number of economic difficulties caused by the Western sanctions towards Russia after 2014, the fall in oil and gas prices in the international markets in comparison to mid-2000s and the turmoil effected by the most recent COVID-19 crisis are likely to keep the number of Russians disfavoring migration quite high for the foreseeable future. That observation, in turn, presents yet another obstacle and an additional adaptation challenge for Turkmen (and Central Asian's) migrants in the country, be it through educational or professional aims, alongside an already complex scenario involving a clash of 'identities' related to both religious and ethnic differences.

CONCLUSION

What caused all this political domestic and external contradictions in Turkmenistan? And moreover, what prompted other former Soviet Central Asian republics to fall into authoritarian rule and lack of accountability before their populations and violations of human rights? According to historian Stephen Kotkin (2002) for instance, the explanation has its origins in the very demise of the USSR, whose Communist Party's disintegration after the attempted reforms undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s left the former Soviet nation-states as perfect vehicles for self-aggrandizement, culminating in political mismanagement and rampant authoritarianism²⁶. Turkmenistan, in this sense, can be seen as text-book example of a Post-Soviet self-serving authoritarian State, embedded in a Stalinist-styled totalitarian political regime and 'Cult of Personality's' extravaganzas. It thus causes no surprise that although Turkmenistan held 9 elections since its independence, none was considered free and fair by international organizations.

non-European semblance) to being framed more often by security officers in the streets of Russia.

26 In this context, concludes the author "nation-Statism has proven instrumental for consolidating and even extending the illiberal hyper-executive branches and shadow economies inherited from Soviet times" (Kotkin 2002: 36).

Indeed, the political contradictions of today's Turkmenistan owe much to its Soviet inheritance, where one-party rule signified, in the words of Hannah Arendt (1948: 253), the "dictatorial domination of one party over all others" and where newly independent ruling elites had easily taken control of the previously established State-machinery for their own benefit and perpetuation. Turkmenistan also join ranks with a relatively known archetypical understanding of the Muslim world²⁷ as non-democratic in general, which is sometimes explained by the lack of "strong institutional and cultural underpinnings" (Tibi, 2008) that democracy requires, where authority is highly personalized, State institutions are undeveloped and civil society is incapable to exercise participation in political decision-making (*ibidem*) as well as to form a credible and strong opposition²⁸. Within such a context, substantial political changes in Turkmenistan in favor of a less authoritarian path or a revolution from the 'bottom' are unlikely to happen, once the country lacks key elements that were present in other successful revolutions occurred in the Post-Soviet space (*e.g.* Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005)²⁹.

In foreign policy terms, although Turkmenistan usually takes pride in its choice for political neutrality after independence, this country's status in the international system could do little to ameliorate Ashkhabad's acute domestic problems and economic dependence on powerful external players such as Russia and China. In all reality, since mid-2000s Turkmenistan only managed to shift its dependence from Moscow to Beijing, but the country's vulnerability remained the same. Chinese investments in Central Asia in general (and in Turkmenistan in particular), on the other hand, while known for its non-attachment character, meaning no social or political change requirements for receptor countries, comes in handy for Turkmenistan's authorities, whose dictatorial exaggerations and misdeeds of its leaders are neither condemned nor sanctioned.

This overall situation prompted many Turkmen to leave their country in search of better economic and educational opportunities elsewhere, mainly to Russia. Nevertheless, many Turkmen, while avoiding inherent problems at their home State, end up having to deal with a different set of problems abroad. Due to their religious affiliation (mostly Islamic) inherited from family tradition as well as from a different cultural upbringing, Turkmen migrants (and Central Asian migrants in general) find themselves in an uneasy position when it comes to assimilation within Russian society. This situation is especially acute taking into consideration a 'tacit' clash of identities stemming from differences in worldviews coexisting in Russia, as well as by negative stereotypes held by the Russian population towards migrants, which demonstrates clear traits of 'prejudice'.

Be it as it may, in order to stop Turkmen from migrating to other neighboring countries, in 2018 the government in Ashkhabad - in a desperate measure to contain the outflow of the youth - banned citizens under 40 years old from leaving

27 89% of Turkmenistan's population is Muslim, from the Sunni branch of Islam, with the second biggest confession being Christianity with a distant 10% (World Atlas, 2019).

28 In Huntington's (1984) view, while requiring uncritical conformity and obedience to authority, Islam inadvertently provides a 'permissive' environment for totalitarian governments in some States, opposing democracy's values such as political openness, pluralism, individual autonomy and freedom.

29 Those elements are enumerated by McFaul (2005) as being: a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime (as in the case of Turkmenistan), an unpopular President, a united and organized opposition, independent media, divisions within coercive apparatus of the State and etc.

Turkmenistan (Radio Liberty, 2018)³⁰, practically locking its own population and preventing many Turkmen from looking for a better life outside. In so doing, the authorities in Ashkhabad ended up *overnight* turning the hopeful aspirations of many into no more than just broken dreams. Therefore, in order to find an escape from the perils of their own reality, people were left only with the following verses of the 18th-century poet Magtymguly about a once existing - and now mostly forgotten - freedom and grandeur in Turkmen lands: “his heart takes off on a horseback; the mountains will turn to lava upon his glance; when the river flows, it will bring honey; the dams will not hold the flood of Turkmen”³¹.

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30 This act however was not publicized in the form of law, in order not to attract international criticism and scrutiny from human's rights organizations.

31 “Köňül howalanar ata çykanda / Daglar lagla döner gyýa bakanda / Bal getirer, joşup derýa akanda / Bent tutdurmaz, gelse sili türkmeniň” (original in Turkmen), from the poem *Türkmeniň* (of the Turkmen).

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BOOK REVIEWS

CHINA'S GLOBALIZATION AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

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Berlie, Jean A. China's Globalization and the Belt and Road Initiative. Palgrave Macmillan 2020. pp. 241.

The Belt and Road initiative (BRI), recently embarked on by China, aims to improve cross-border infrastructure in order to reduce transportation costs across a massive geographical area between China and Europe. It aims to stimulate economic development over a vast area covering sub-regions in Asia, Europe and Africa. We still do not have official information about what countries are covered by BRI. However, most importantly, this massive bloc between the EU and China accounts for 64 percent of the world's population and 30 percent of global GDP. This book tries to analyze the risks and prospects of the initiative in all possible regions involving regional experts. But all the experts are trying to answer an important political question - is the initiative China's attempt to manage Globalization by creating new rules in global trade?

The authors of the book emphasize that China's launching of its initiative is a change to the "peaceful rise" of the reorganization of space in Asia and Africa. Analyzing the chapters, we can say that the authors identify three directions in which China is moving towards achieving its goal. First, the development of strategic industries, for which the PRC is taking the lead in the most advanced technologies of the new industrial revolution: the fifth-generation network (5G) and automated production technologies. This will help ensure connectivity across China's tech ecosystems. Second, for the physical unification of Asia and Africa, the infrastructure of land and sea transport corridors is being developed. Third, new financial and economic instruments and organizations are being created: investment banks, operational systems, trading/reserve currencies.

For all this, China has launched various projects under the Belt and Road brand and has supported the conjunction of national development strategies of the countries participating in the BRI. The authors highlight the strengthening of coordination with such political initiatives as the EAEU, the ASEAN General Program for Interconnection and Interchange, Kazakhstan's Nuryl Zhol, Turkey's Central Corridor, Mongolia's Steppe Route, Vietnam's Two Corridors, One Circle, Poland's Amber Road frameworks, and Beijing achieved understanding between the development plans of China and Laos, Cambodia,

Myanmar, and Beijing initiated 17+1 format for cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries. The authors of the book analyze various formats of interaction between different regions of Eurasia and Africa with the Chinese initiative providing an extensive analysis of the global actions of China, which is one of the unique features of the book.

Answering an important question of the book, the authors show how in different regions of the world the economic activity of China is moving into certain political frameworks and allows it to use this business-activity to enhance its role in regional politics and global governance. The authors provide an insight into how the Chinese leaders are trying to use the economy to increase its role in global processes. At the same time, we have the opportunity to follow the evolution of the analysis of the initiative among global and regional players. Of course, China is promoting that BRI as an economic Initiative and denies the presence of geopolitical aspirations. Nevertheless, most governments and experts see that BRI is largely aimed not only at promoting economic projects but also at increasing Chinese political influence as well as its capacity to reform global governance.

In their analysis, the authors highlight the important risks of the Belt and Road, the BRI participants are concerned about the continued relative closure of the Chinese market. Another point is related to the fact that Chinese companies often increase the number of projects with their participation without sufficient concern about their subsequent payback. Therefore, there may be a threat of the emergence of low-quality assets that will never recoup the money spent on them. Several Asian countries have already faced difficulties related to the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road initiative, and some of them (e.g. Malaysia) decided to revise the conditions for participation in the initiative.

The experts studied the case of Malaysia and Indonesia in great detail in chapter 7. In general, the example of Malaysia demonstrates how countries should deal with China protecting their own interests. In 2018, after coming to power, Premier Mahathir halted the construction of the East Coast Rail Link, which was carried out with Chinese participation. Mahathir referred to that the final cost was dictated by corruption interests and the prices were excessively elevated. After negotiations, the Malaysian authorities were able to reduce the final price of the railroad by almost 30%. This case is an important precedent to showing that negotiations with China can and should be conducted on favorable terms.

In conclusion, the authors express the hope that the history of the Belt and Road will be a successful example of globalization. However, the conclusions about the risks and opportunities of the BRI are not unique, which is a factor that undermines the meaning of the work. Experts mention several conditions to be held by China and for the participating countries for the success of the BRI. The first condition is transparency in project planning, financial expenses and budgeting, and procurement. Greater transparency is needed to engage communities and build public confidence. The second is reforms that take into account the specifics of the participating countries. For example, trade policies and border controls in many countries impede cross-border trade. Simplifying the conditions for the entry and exit of goods is a prerequisite for countries to

fully reap the benefits of Belt and Road investments. The third is multilateral cooperation, including project coordination. In order for countries to take full advantage of the positive spillovers associated with economic corridors, they should work together to unify infrastructure standards, harmonize legal regulations, and manage environmental risks. Considering all of the above, I would like to express my gratitude to the authors of this work. The book will be an important contribution to the study of the Belt and Road initiative, which will help to better understand this initiative and evaluate China's actions in a more objective way.

**THE NEW MAP: ENERGY, CLIMATE AND
THE CLASH OF NATIONS**

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Daniel Yergin. The New Map: Energy, Climate and the Clash of Nations. New York: Penguin Press 2020. pp. 492.

Daniel Yergin can be accepted as a leading authority on energy, geopolitics and economy. He appeared before the book “The Map” with important books such as “The Prize”, “The Quest” and “Shattered Peace”. Yergin won the Pulitzer Award in 1992 with “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power”, which focused on the process following the emergence of oil in the USA in the 19th century. His latest book is “The Map: Energy, Climate and The Clash of Nations” published by Penguin Press in 2020.

In his book “The Map”, Yergin examines the changing international system based on energy and geopolitics. The change in the international system has been defined as the new world map. He also states that the coronavirus, which emerged in China in 2020 and spread all over the world, complicates the new map. Within this context, the book tries to make sense of this new map by focusing on some questions such as how has “the shale revolution” changed the US position in the world?, how and why are new cold wars developing between the United States on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other and energy’s role in them?, how is the overall relationship between the US and China changing from “engagement” to “strategic rivalry” as the beginning of the new cold war?, How are unstable the foundations of the Middle East, which currently supplies one third of the world’s total oil and a significant amount of natural gas?, how can the transformation from fossil fuels to renewable energy take place?

Within this framework, the “New Map of America” chapter in the book emphasizes that the unexpected “Shale Revolution” has radically changed the energy geopolitics of the world. Accordingly, the USA has become one of the new geopolitical energy centers with the effect of shale revolution. The Shale revolution has pitted the US against Russia and Saudi Arabia and has also turned the US into one of the world’s largest energy exporters. Despite environmental concerns, particularly regarding the shale gas extraction process, it has created new job opportunities in almost all states in the USA.

In the “Russia’s Map” chapter of the book, it is emphasized that Russia became the “Great Power” again in Putin’s period. Energy constitutes the main motivation of Russia’s geopolitical rise. In this sense, Russia can be defined as an energy superpower. Energy trade and Russia’s power based on energy resources also affect foreign policy. For example, the source of tensions between Russia and Ukraine is natural gas-based. Energy dependence on Russia has strengthened Russia’s hand in foreign policy. On the other hand, the most vulnerable situation for Russia is that the Russian economy is also dependent on energy. Apart from that, from the Russian perspective, the map shows that Russia has turned to the Middle East and developed its relations with China. At this point, China and Russia take a common stance against the Western Hegemony in foreign policy in general and the US hegemony in particular.

The “China’s Map” chapter, first of all, states that China has increased its capacities in every aspect, from military to economy, from technology to politics. Additionally, this chapter emphasizes that China, described as the “workshop of the world”, is the world’s second largest economy, and in this context, this huge industry and economy has a huge energy need. Apart from this, the South China Sea as the most critical oceanic trade route is one of the most important places in China’s map to maintain control over the maritime trade routes. Another issue highlighted in this part of the book is China’s Belt and Road Initiative. According to the book, the two main objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative are to find new markets for its products and to reach new energy and raw materials. It is also discussed whether China will become the new leader in world politics with this project.

According to the chapter of “Maps of the Middle East” in the book, the main determinants of the map of the Middle East are gas and oil. Even gas and oil are defined as the identity of the region. However, the low oil prices that have emerged since 2014 caused a discussion on the future of oil in the region. Especially the low demand experienced in 2020 caused the Middle East economies to be revised and the oil-based economy model to be discussed. The issue is not only about the decrease in demand due to the pandemic or the low oil prices. The biggest challenge facing oil today is the new automobile technology that can be defined as an electric and driverless vehicle.

The chapter called “Roadmap” in the book emphasizes on Auto-tech as a new trillion-dollar industry. This new debate is linked both to climate change, to the future of geopolitics, and to the future of oil. In this context, the electric vehicle is an ontological problem for the global automobile industry. Likewise, this situation poses equally a problem for the world oil industry. Considering that 35% of the world’s oil demand stems from cars and light trucks, the extent of the transformation’s impact can be understood more clearly. In this sense, this part of the book focuses on the auto-tech transformation and its effects on the global economy, jobs, national economies and geopolitics.

The last chapter in the book called as “Climate Map” focuses on the energy transition, green deals, renewable energy and breakthrough technologies. In this sense, climate change caused by humans is accepted as the main determinant of the new map of energy. Climate change-based concerns arising from the increase of natural disasters such as forest fires, drought, torrential rainfalls, coastal flooding, heat waves, melting ice and hurricanes constitute the main

motivation for “Energy Transition”. Within this context, this chapter emphasizes the climate policies powered by research and observation, climate models, political mobility, social activism, financial institutions and deepening anxiety.

The two new topics of discussion in the last two chapters in the book, as new auto-tech industry and climate change, have both been the main accelerators of energy transformation and seem to constitute the main subject of interstate struggle in the upcoming period.

The final word about the book is that, in understandable language, The Map is suitable not only for energy professionals, but also for anyone interested in international systems analysis.

Editorial Principles

Eurasian Research Journal aims to publish scientific articles on dynamic realities of the Eurasian region in economics, finance, energy, transportation, security and other related fields. It also aims to contribute to the scientific literature, particularly, on Turkic speaking countries.

Submissions to *Eurasian Research Journal* should be original articles producing new and worthwhile ideas and perspectives or evaluating previous studies in the field. *Eurasian Research Journal* also publishes essays introducing authors and works and announcing new and recent activities related to the Turkic world.

An article to be published in *Eurasian Research Journal* should not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere. Papers presented at a conference or symposium may be accepted for publication if this is clearly indicated.

Eurasian Research Journal is published biannually: in January and July. Each issue is forwarded to subscribers, libraries and international indexing institutions within one month after its publication.

Review of Articles

Articles submitted to *Eurasian Research Journal* are first reviewed by the Editorial Board in terms of the journal's editorial principles. Those found unsuitable are returned to their authors for revision. Academic objectivity and scientific quality are considered of paramount importance. Submissions found suitable are referred to two referees working in relevant fields. The names of the referees are kept confidential and referee reports are archived for five years. If one of the referee reports is positive and the other negative, the article may be forwarded to a third referee for further assessment or alternatively, the Editorial Board may make a final decision based on the nature of the two reports. The authors are responsible for revising their articles in line with the criticism and suggestions made by the referees and the Editorial Board. If they disagree with any issues, they may make an objection by providing clearly-stated reasons. Submissions which are not accepted for publication are not returned to their authors.

The royalty rights of the articles accepted for publication are considered transferred to Eurasian Research Institute of Akhmet Yassawi University. Authors have full responsibility for the views expressed in their articles and for their stylistic preferences. Quotations from other articles and duplication of photographs are permitted as long as they are fully referenced and cited.

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The language of the journal is English.

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The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *Eurasian Research Journal*:

1. Title of the article: The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in **bold** characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

3. Abstract: The article should include an abstract in English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 100 and a maximum of 250 words. The abstract should not include references to sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article. The English and Russian versions of the title, abstract and keywords should be placed at the end of the article. In case the Russian abstract is not submitted, it will be added later by the journal.

4. Body Text: The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 7.000 words including the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided.

5. Section Titles: The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appendices) should be fully capitalized while the sub-titles should have only their first letters capitalized and should be written in bold characters.

6. Tables and Figures: Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left, and should **not** be in italics. The caption should be written in italics, and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be centered right below the figures. The figure numbers should be written in italics followed by a full-stop. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written in italics, and the first letter of each word should be capitalized. Below is an example of a table.

Table 1. *Information Concerning Publications in Eurasian Research Journal*

Publication type	Number of publication	Number of pages			Number of references		
		N	X	SS	N	X	SS
Article	96	2,042	21.3	7.5	2,646	27.6	15.8
Book review	4	30	7.5	4.4	31	7.8	8.3
Total	100	2,072	20.7	7.9	2,677	26.8	16.1

Source: Statistical Country Profiles

7. Pictures: Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures. The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

Below is an example of a picture.

Picture 1. *Ancient Rune script*



Source: en.wiktionary.org

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Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Koprulu 1944: 15)

When sources with several authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and 'et. al' is added.

(Gokay et al. 2002: 18)

If the text already includes the name of the author, only the date should be given:

In this respect, Tanpinar (1976: 131) says ...

In sources and manuscripts with no publication date, only the surname of the author should be written; in encyclopedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written.

While quoting from a quotation, the original source should also be specified:

Koprulu (1926, qtd. in Celik 1998).

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates; they should also be cited in the bibliography. Internet references should always include date of access and be cited in the bibliography.

www.turkedebiyatilisimlersozlugu.com [Accessed: 15.12.2014]

9. References: References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

Isen, Mustafa (2010). *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Istanbul: Kapi Yay.

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat (1961). *Azeri Edebiyatının Tekamulu*. Istanbul: MEB Yay.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika and Asim Bezirci (1981). *Edebiyatımızda Secme Hikayeler*. Basvuru Kitapları. Istanbul: Gozlem Yay.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Akyuz, Kenan et al. (1958). *Fuzuli Turkce Divan*. Ankara: Is Bankasi Yay.

The titles of books and journals should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, Ilhan (1997). *Poetika*. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yay.

Demir, Nurettin (2012). "Turkcede Evidensiyel". *Eurasian Research Journal, Turk Dunyasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 62: 97-117.

Translator's, compiler's and editor's names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example:

Shaw, Stanford (1982). *Osmanli Imparatorlugu*. Trans. Mehmet Harmanci. Istanbul: Sermet Matb.

If several references by the same author need to be cited, then the name and surname of the author need not be repeated for subsequent entries following the first entry. A long dash may be used instead. Several references by the same author should be listed according to the alphabetical order of work titles.

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Develi, Hayati (2002). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzuil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar*. Ankara: TDK Yay.

_____ (2003). *XVIII. Yuzuil Istanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe*. Istanbul: Kitabevi.

If **more than one work by the same author of the same date** need to be cited, they should be indicated by (a, b).

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002a). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar*. Ankara: TDK Yay.

Develi, Hayati (2002b). *XVIII. Yuzyil Istanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe*. Istanbul: Kitabevi

For **encyclopedia entries**, if the author of the encyclopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

Ipekten, Haluk (1991). "Azmi-zade Mustafa Haleti". *Islam Ansiklopedisi*. C. 4. Istanbul: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yay. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the following order should be followed: surname and name of the author, date, full title of thesis in italics, thesis type, city where the university is located, and the name of the university:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu (2012). *Garibi'nin Yusuf u Zuleyha'si: Inceleme-Tenkitli Mehtin-Dizin*. Master's Thesis. Kırşehir: Ahi Evran Universitesi.

Handwritten manuscripts should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number. sheet.

Example:

Asim. *Zeyl-i Zubdetu'l-Es'ar*. Millet Kutuphanesi. A. Emiri Efendi. No. 1326. vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, the following order should be followed: Author surname, Author name. "Title of message". Internet address. (Date of Access)

Example:

Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi. "Gecinme Endeksi (Ucretliler)" Elektronik Veri Dagitim Sistemi. <http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/> (Accessed: 04.02.2009).

An article accepted for publication but not yet published can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Atilim, Murat and Ekin Tokat (2008). "Forecasting Oil Price Movements with Crack Spread Futures". *Energy Economics*. In print (doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.07.008).

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Apart from Style Guidelines for Book Reviews Academic Articles, the Eurasian Research Journal (ERJ) publishes Book Reviews. Usually, there are two Book Reviews published in each issue of the journal. The following rules should be observed while preparing a Book Review for submission to the ERJ:

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4. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in bold characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.
5. The text of a Book Review should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1.5 line spacing. Margins of 2.5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered.
6. Tables and Figures should not be used in a Book Review.
7. All Author(s) should refrain from using contractions, first or second person viewpoints, incomplete sentences, ambiguous terminology, and slang, informal style as well as wordy phrases.
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